

Abstract

This paper scrutinizes the proposals put forth by a number of scholars, to the effect that both progressives and habituals are stative. None of the reasons advanced in the literature appears to be compelling. On the contrary, there are stringent theoretical reasons to reject these claims, which seem to merge notions belonging to quite different subdomains of tense and aspect semantics. Indeed, the notion "stative" belongs to the subdomain of actionality, while "progressive" and "habitual" belong to the subdomain of aspect. It can easily be shown that stative verbs may take on any aspectual value, including the two under discussion. As to the progressive and habitual aspects, they may readily apply to nonstative verbs, in which case they show properties very different from stative verbs, even when the latter are used in progressive or habitual contexts. Thus, the proposals under scrutiny are rejected as an instance of categorical confusion. There is, however, a sense in which the suggestion that habituals are stative may be retained. This is when a particular subset of habituals, here called "attitudinals," is concerned. Attitudinals refer to situations in which the repeated occurrence of a given event is taken to be the defining property of an individual or object. It is shown that attitudinals consist of "activities" (in the Vendlerian sense) that are contextually turned into permanent statives.

1. Introduction

The fundamental assumption on which this paper is based is the need to distinguish as neatly as possible, whenever there are good reasons to do so, between the different categories used in the description of tense-aspect systems. Unfortunately, a lack of general agreement between scholars on the theoretical tools to be used in the analysis is frequently encountered in the literature, and this has obvious drawbacks. This is also due to

different theoretical perspectives, which in itself is not a negative factor. However, I believe that in some relevant cases we are faced with the actual confusion of notions that should best be kept apart, if we want to achieve a deeper understanding of this topic. The most conspicuous examples are represented by the frequent confusion between *tense* and *temporal reference* on the one side, and *actionality* (i.e. Aktionsart)¹ and *aspect* on the other side.

Before I go any further, I feel it necessary to present a short sketch of the conceptual framework that I am assuming. This is an obvious consequence of what I have just said. Agreements or disagreements on what I am going to propose may be better directed, once purely terminological misunderstandings are put aside. To provide a fairly well known reference, let me say that my approach to the domain of tense and aspect, as developed in Bertinetto (1986), is rather close to the one advocated by Comrie (1976, 1985). I assume therefore that there are three main subdomains:

– *Temporal reference*: the localization of the event with respect to the speech point. This allows us to distinguish between past, present, and future temporal reference. This is normally, but not invariably, achieved by means of morphological devices, that is, tenses; however, these two notions do not coincide, as we shall soon verify.

– *Aspect*: the specific point of view adopted by the speaker/writer. Typically, the event may be presented as completed or incomplete: this is the basis for the fundamental distinction between perfective and imperfective aspects. Although there may exist intermediate cases, these two compartments are normally quite apart from each other. To the first belong, in particular, the aoristic (cf. the simple past in English) and the perfect aspect; to the latter, the progressive and the habitual. This does not exhaust the inventory of the major aspectual distinctions, but it will suffice for our present purposes. Again, aspect is normally, but not invariably, expressed by means of morphological devices (i.e. tenses or specific periphrases); see below for further qualifications.

– *Actionality*: the type of the event, specified according to a limited number of relevant properties. To make things simpler, here I shall exclusively refer to the well-known Vendlerian classes, although various refinements have been put forth in this connection. The basic oppositions are those between *punctual* vs. *durative* events, *telic* vs. *atelic* (or bounded vs. unbounded), and *static* vs. *dynamic*. This allows us to isolate the following four classes: *statives*, *activities*, *accomplishments*, and *achievements*. While temporal reference and aspect (although ultimately of a semantic nature) are primarily anchored on the morphological specifications available to each language, actionality is essentially rooted in the

lexicon. Thus, the last category normally lacks an overt morphological marking, but it may have one. This is typically the case of the verbal lexicon of Slavic languages, where the fundamental opposition between “perfective” and “imperfective” verbs may often (although not invariably) be interpreted in terms of the opposition *telic/atelic*.²

On the basis of this, it should become clear that, as a matter of principle, *tense* should not be confused with temporal reference. Indeed, all tenses (without exception) have BOTH temporal AND aspectual properties, differently characterized according to the language considered.³ Thus, for instance, we may say that the imperfect of Romance languages has past temporal reference (at least in its most typical uses) and imperfective aspect (in most of its uses); or that the German preterite has past temporal reference and is neutral on aspectual grounds. Moreover, it is sometimes the case (e.g. in classical Arabic) that tenses have a primarily aspectual value, with temporal reference being recovered by implication through contextual information (Cohen 1989). It would be utterly meaningless, in such cases, to take “tense” as the equivalent of “temporal reference.” Indeed, the notion “tense” refers to specific morphological concretions, which have developed in each particular language. This explains, by the way, why languages may fundamentally express the same sort of temporal and aspectual values, despite the dramatic differences in the number of morphological distinctions available in each tense system (compare a “rich” system such as that of Bulgarian with a “poor” system such as that of Classical Arabic).

Equally disruptive is the confusion that is frequently made between aspect and actionality. Some scholars claim, or implicitly assume, that these notions are two facets of the same phenomenon. However, this leads to unacceptable results.⁴ In Bertinetto and Delfitto (1992) a detailed analysis was carried out of the compatibility of various temporal adverbs with the most prominent actional and aspectual categories, showing that these two notions have to be kept apart if one hopes ever to make sense of the language data. Consider, for instance, the behavior of the adverb type “in X Time” (where “X Time” stands for any quantified conventional division of time, such as *two days*, *half an hour*, *four weeks*, and the like) and the adverbs of “temporal graduality” such as *gradually*, *little by little*, and the like. The former type is only compatible with telic verbs on actional and with perfectivity on aspectual grounds, while the latter type of adverbs may only be used with accomplishment verbs (i.e. a subclass of telic predicates) and is absolutely neutral with respect to aspectual values. Consider the following examples:⁵

- (3) a. Every morning, at the end of the school, I was very hungry [= habitual].
 b. When John arrived home yesterday, I was very hungry [= progressive].
 c. Yesterday morning, between 10 and 12, I was very hungry [= perfective].

These three sentences have different aspectual meanings, although they exhibit the same stative predicate. Sentence (a) has a habitual meaning. Sentence (b) has a progressive meaning, as witnessed by the possible interruption of the situation suggested by a contextual continuation like ...*but as soon as I saw him, I forgot all about my belly*. Finally, sentence (c) exhibits a perfective reading, where the event is viewed as a completed situation, corresponding to a closed interval. This would appear even more clearly in, for example, Italian, where we could exploit the aspectual contrast between imperfect and preterite (*Ieri mattina, tra le 10 e le 12, avevo/ho avuto molta fame*). Although the imperfect in these contexts loses much of its truly imperfective character, the compound preterite necessarily conveys a perfective meaning. Putting all this together, there is no doubt that stative predicates are, in themselves, compatible with any aspectual values.

Unsurprisingly, by carefully selecting the syntactic constructions specifically requiring the progressive (or the habitual) aspect, one can easily show that statives and progressives (or habituals) may occur in the same contexts and have enough properties in common in this respect. However, this is just as predicted by the theoretical framework sketched above and merely shows that stative verbs may occur in the relevant aspectual contexts. In no way does this prove that progressives and habituals are, in all respect, stative. Indeed, according to the model assumed here, also shared by Castelnovo (1993), an assertion like this appears to be a categorical mistake, since stativity belongs to the actional subdomain, whereas progressivity and habituality are specifications within the aspectual subdomain. One should rather say that stative verbs with a progressive interpretation may occur in the same contexts where nonstative verbs with a progressive interpretation are found, minor differences put aside (and similarly with "habitual" instead of "progressive"). Clearly, when things are presented in this way, the whole issue appears to be, as it really is, circular.⁷

In this paper, I shall examine the two claims I am going to argue against in the order given above: first the (alleged) identification of progressives and statives, then that of habituals and statives. In both cases, I will show that although there are analogies, there are also funda-

- (1) a. *Mary danced in two hours [=atelic, perfective].
 b. *Mary was dancing in two hours [=atelic, imperfective].
 c. Mary painted the wall in two hours [=telic, perfective].
 d. ??Mary was painting the wall in two hours [=telic, imperfective].
 (2) a. *Mary danced gradually [=atelic, perfective].
 b. *Mary was dancing gradually [=atelic, imperfective].
 c. Mary painted the wall gradually [=telic, perfective].
 d. Mary was painting the wall gradually [=telic, imperfective].

I shall return to these adverbs again in the following sections, for they will also appear in the diagnostics used in this paper. What should be kept in mind is that, generally speaking, any temporal adverb is a twofold entity, showing selective inclinations with respect to both aspect and actionality. Thus, there is good evidence that these two notions must be carefully kept apart on theoretical grounds. Of course, their autonomy is not absolute. There are circumstances where they interact in a delicate way, as in the so-called *imperfective paradox*, where the usage of imperfective tenses (an aspectual category) produces the (contextually induced) detelicization of telic predicates (an actional category).⁶ Besides, it should be noted that temporal adverbs do not always yield a sharp discrimination of aspect and actionality. This may depend on the weak discriminating power of some adverbs or, possibly, on contextual effects. However, on the whole the picture is quite clear, for we find numerous instances of neat discrimination based on the usage of temporal adverbs.

One typical aspect of the confusion between aspect and actionality is the frequent claim that verbs in the progressive form are stative, or behave like statives. Often mixed with this claim is the analogous one that habituals are stative. In this paper I shall try to show that both claims are incorrect. True, there are some crucial analogies between progressives and statives on the one hand, and habituals and statives on the other, but this does not imply identity, for there are also crucial differences, which should not be overlooked. Ultimately, such claims seem to be based on the overestimation of the similarities that can be observed in those contexts, where stative verbs may receive a progressive or a habitual interpretation. Obviously, whenever a stative verb may receive either a progressive or a habitual reading, there is a broad intersection of properties between these categories. This does not imply, however, that in all situations progressives or habituals share basic properties with statives. Indeed, statives, as an actional class, are compatible with just any aspectual value, among which progressivity and habituality are but two of the available possibilities. Consider, to this effect, the following examples:

mental divergences, both of them perfectly predictable according to a sufficiently refined theory of tense and aspect semantics. However, although the two issues are parallel in this respect, I shall also contend that there is much more in the claim that habituals are statives. Indeed, I will show that there is a specific subclass of habituals, here named *attitudinal*s, that presuppose the stativization of predicates that are non-stative in their default meaning. Thus, while the latter claim lacks general validity, it can nevertheless be retained in this restricted sense.

2. Progressives and statives

2.1. Analogies between progressives and statives

I am not in a position to assess who was the first scholar to advance the proposal concerning the equivalence of progressives and statives, nor to list all its proponents. The claim is explicitly put forward by the following authors at least: Bertinetto (1980), Vlach (1981, 1993), Mufwene (1984), Saurer (1984), Dowty (1986), Langacker (1987), Parsons (1989), and Mittwoch (1988), while Smith (1983) assumes a somewhat ambiguous stance (cf. also note 4). Among these authors, a special influence was exerted by Vlach. His reasons for the identification of progressives with statives are as follows (1981: 273–274):

i. Both (4a) and (4b) imply that Max was here or was running before my arrival; by contrast, (4c) does not share this implication:

- (4) a. Max was here when I arrived.
b. Max was running when I arrived.
c. Max ran when I arrived.

ii. Progressives are built by means of the stative verb *be* (cf. also It. *stare*, Sp. and Port. *estar*).

iii. Progressives are often expressed by means of formatives having a locative meaning, or they may have developed out of such constructions (and locative morphemes are intrinsically stative).

iv. In many cases, a progressive expression may be paraphrased by means of a copular construction with transparent stative meaning. Compare (5):

- (5) John is flying = John is in flight.

v. Progressives do not take the progressive. Compare (6):

- (6) *Max is being running.

Vlach claims in this connection that “the function of the progressive operator is to make stative sentences, and, therefore, there is no reason for the progressive to apply to sentences that are already stative” (1981: 274). A somewhat less preconceived (but equally circular) view of the problem is the one advocated in Bertinetto (1980), where it is claimed that since the progressive morphology cannot normally apply to statives, there are reasons to assume that the function of the progressive is to stativize the predicate (on the reasonable assumption that there would be no need to stativize an already stative predicate).

Mittwoch (1988: 233–234) repeats Vlach’s arguments, adding the following two:⁸

vi. the occurrence of both progressives and statives in the scope of *already*;

vii. the occurrence of both progressives and statives in the scope of *seem*, as shown by the comparison between (7a) and (7b), where the latter is only good in a habitual reading:

- (7) a. John seemed to be hungry.
b. John seemed to be running.
c. John seemed to run.

She then concludes that progressives are “a sub-group of statives that is *sui generis*” (1988: 234).

Further analogies between statives and progressives are the following, suggested by Bertinetto (1986: 189) (who, nevertheless, rejects the identification of progressives and statives):

viii. the compatibility of both progressives and statives with the temporal adverbs *still* and It. “*da X Tempo*” (or Eng. “*for X Time*”, when the latter takes on a comparable meaning). Compare (8) and (9):

- (8) a. John was still angry.
b. John was still working.
c. *John worked still.⁹

- (9) a. John has been very tired for the last two hours.
b. John has been working very hard for the last two days.
c. ??John has worked very hard for the last two days.¹⁰

ix. the incompatibility with “*in X Time*” (note that [10a] is only marginally good with inceptive, nonstandard meaning, just as [10b] may receive a prospective, i.e. not truly progressive, reading; cf. also note 5):

- (10) a. *John was angry in two minutes.
b. *John was writing a letter in two minutes.
c. John wrote a letter in two minutes.

The same conclusion would be reached with the adverb type "*until t_x*" (cf. **John was angry/writing a letter until 3 o'clock*).

x. the incompatibility with the imperative:

- (11) a. *Possess a car!
b. *Be writing a letter!

2.2. Objections to the equivalence between progressives and statives

A closer inspection of arguments (i)–(x) shows that, in most cases, these are far from conclusive. True, some of them point to a deep semantic analogy that must be understood as the main reason for the apparent resemblance between progressives and statives. This applies in particular to arguments (ii)–(iv), which are descriptive in character. I return to this in section 2.4 below. But notice that even in these cases one may find exceptions and counterexamples, as we shall see. Let us reconsider each point.

As to (i), we may note that the observed equivalence between statives and progressives is far from surprising, for sentences like (4a)–(4b) are among the most typical contexts requiring a progressive interpretation. This behavior is indeed predicted by the model presented in section 1 (cf. in particular example [3]). It is interesting, however, to observe that Smith (1983: 487) objects, in this connection, that while progressives have a single reading, statives may have two: a durative reading (the one shared also by progressives) and an inceptive one, as shown by (12):

- (12) a. Mary was laughing when she saw John.
b. John was angry when Mary dropped the brandy snifter.

Obviously, the second reading is far from generalized, and often quite idiomatic.¹¹ Besides, in Romance languages this would often depend on tense choice: only aoristic tenses like the (simple and/or compound) preterite would entail the inceptive reading in the context given, in contrast with the essentially imperfective ones, like the imperfect.¹² When viewed in this way, it becomes clear that the alternative readings of (12b) presuppose two radically different aspectual construals, parallel to the ones exhibited in the following examples:

- (13) a. Mary was laughing when she saw John [(12a)].
b. Mary laughed when she saw John.

The reason why this cannot emerge in (12b) depends on the ambiguous aspectual value of the English simple past, when used with stative verbs. Indeed, this tense may receive an imperfective (specifically, progressive)

interpretation as in (13a), or a perfective (aoristic, and more specifically inceptive) interpretation as in (13b). Thus, once considered in a broader typological framework, the objection raised by Smith loses much of its strength. Nevertheless, the contrast exhibited in (12) is worth mentioning, for it also tells us that some stative verbs may receive a nonstative interpretation in the appropriate contexts, by taking on an inceptive reading. In fact, what we observe in the inceptive interpretation of (12b) is a twofold transformation: from the aspectual point of view, there is a transition from progressive to aoristic (witness the contrast in [13a]–[13b]); from the actional point of view, there is a transfer from a stative to a dynamic predicate (specifically, an achievement). In this paper I shall not directly address these questions; but see section 2.3 below for some suggestions on the actional hybridism of stative verbs.

As to point (ii), it should be noted that in many languages (as observed in note 7) the progressive meaning is also accessible to simple tenses, such as the present or the imperfect in Romance languages. Thus, the presence of copular verbs is not a prerequisite for the arising of the semantic notion "progressive."

As to (iii), it is undoubtedly true that many languages express the progressive by means of locative formatives (Gebert, i.p.; to the examples listed there, add at least the Finnish progressive, derived from the inessive case of the so-called third infinitive). It must be noticed though that while (14a) is fine, (14b) is odd:

- (14) a. At 3 o'clock, John was running.
b. ?At 3 o'clock, John was hungry.

In fact, only a small subgroup of statives admit of a punctual temporal localization, such as *to be 3 o'clock*, *to be on the point of leaving*, etc. (Mittwoch 1988: 234); compare *At 3 o'clock, John was on the verge of leaving*. A similar contrast is proposed by Mufwene (1984: 45):

- (15) a. Max was chortling when I got up yesterday morning, and he was still at it when I went to bed.
b. *Max loved Susan pretty much last year and he was still at it when I left them.

As to (iv), it should be remarked that very often there is no obvious nominal paraphrase, so that the analogy appears to be very vague (cf. *John is eating a sandwich* = ?*John is in the eating of a sandwich*). And note that in languages other than English this restriction is even more severe, for there are usually strong constraints on nominalization processes.

As to (v), one might wish to object that there may be independent reasons for the observed regularity, presumably morphological restric-

tions of a general kind.¹³ I shall have more to say about this issue in section 2.3.

As to (vi) and (viii), we are faced with a lack of generality in the argument. Indeed, many statives do not accept these adverbs, while progressives are always compatible with them. Consider the case of permanent statives, as in (16):

- (16) a. ??John already belongs to a rich family.
b. ??John has belonged to a rich family for two years, now.

Moreover, *already* may also cooccur with nonprogressive perfect tenses (cf. *I have already eaten*), so that the impact of the argument is weakened. One might remark in this connection that perfect tenses also point, in a way, to a static situation, that is, a resulting state. But this would imply that the equivalence between progressives and statives should also be extended to perfect tenses: a proposal that has not yet been advanced, for self-evident reasons, despite the existence of languages that exhibit morphological links between perfect and progressive (Ebert i.p.).

As to (vii), Mittwoch herself objects, as noted above, that (7c) must be given a habitual reading, in contrast with (7a)–(7b). Thus, in this case there seems to be a similarity of behavior between statives and progressives. Furthermore, according to the same author, the similarity also extends to habituals, for she assumes that they too are statives (I shall address this issue in section 3 below). But note that this similarity is not valid for any language: in Italian, for instance, the formal parallelism would be lost. Compare the following sentences, corresponding to (7a) and (7b) respectively: *Gianni sembra essere arrabbiato* (=infinitive) and *Sembra che Gianni stia correndo* (=subjunctive present progressive), as opposed to ??*Gianni sembra stare correndo* (=infinitive progressive), which is rather marginal. As to *Gianni sembra correre* (infinitive), it is quite implausible with progressive meaning and tends to be interpreted habitually (cf. *Gianni sembra correre anche quando cammina* 'G. seems to run even when he walks'). Thus, in Italian the parallelism tends to hold for statives and habituals, to the exclusion of progressives.

Point (ix) is a very robust criterion but is easily interpretable on independent grounds, for we know that the adverb "in X Time" takes only telic verbs and perfective tenses, as shown in (1). Hence, this adverb is obviously incompatible with stative verbs on actional grounds (since they are atelic), and with progressives on aspectual grounds (since they are imperfective).

Finally, point (x) is not equally crucial in all languages. The restriction on the imperative is very strong in Modern Italian, but less so in Old Italian or Contemporary English, where we may find examples such as

- (17) a. Però lascia i piaceri (...) e sta più tosto pregando /Carlo Bascapé, late sixteenth–early seventeenth centuries/ 'Thus neglect the pleasures ... and be rather praying!'
b. Be working when the boss comes!

Besides, as a test for stativity, the imperative is less effective than the progressive, for the incompatibility with the imperative also characterizes nonstative nonagentive verbs (cf. *rain, fall, stumble*, etc.). Thus, although all stative verbs, in the relevant meaning, are incompatible with the imperative, not all verbs that refuse the imperative should be considered stative.

Summarizing, the arguments reviewed may be grouped as shown below, with reference to their strength:

- some are definitely ill-founded ([iii], [iv]);
- some are unconvincing, for the observed regularity rests on independent reasons ([v], [ix]);
- some suffer from a lack of generality ([vi], [viii]), possibly because they reflect the behavior of specific languages, rather than capturing the behavior of progressives and statives on genuine interlinguistic grounds ([ii], [vii], [xi]);
- the only argument that is substantially correct is (i), despite some marginal divergences that may be observed between statives and progressives. As already noted, the theoretical model assumed here predicts this to be so, for nothing prevents stative verbs from appearing in truly progressive contexts.

2.3. Divergences between progressives and statives

In section 2.1 we examined a number of alleged analogies between statives and progressives. Subsequently, in section 2.2 we observed that in most cases the impact of these arguments is very limited. Pursuing this line of reasoning, in this section I shall claim that, besides analogies, there also are sharp divergences between progressives and statives. Arguments (a)–(b) derive from Bertinetto (1986: 190) (cf. also Hataav 1989).

- a. Progressives and statives exhibit different degrees of compatibility with the habitual aspect. Statives (provided they do not refer to permanent states of affairs) are fully grammatical in similar contexts, as shown by (18c), whereas progressives, although sometimes acquiring habitual meaning (witness [18a]), do so less readily (cf. [18b]):

- (18) a. Whenever I came, John was working hard.
 b. ??Every morning, towards 12 o'clock, John was working very hard.
 c. Every morning, towards 12 o'clock, John was very hungry.¹⁴

b. Usually (indeed, with few exceptions) statives refer to "dense" situations, that is, situations that cannot be interrupted without causing the cessation of the state referred to. Progressives, on the other hand, admit very easily of interruptions. Thus, (19a) means that during each instant of the given interval John was hungry, whereas (19b) allows for breaks in the process of working:

- (19) a. Yesterday, between 2 and 3 o'clock, John was very hungry.
 b. Yesterday, between 2 and 3 o'clock, John was working hard.

The property of "density" (under various denominations) is frequently referred to in the literature. Here again I cannot trace the origin of this position, which is already assumed by Gabbay and Moravcsik (1980). It should be noted, however, that this characterization of stative verbs does not hold in all instances. There may be exceptions, such as *I lived in Paris from 1985 to 1988*, which may be true even if I lived elsewhere (while on holiday, for instance) for short periods over that time. Thus, although it is generally the case that statives involve "density," this argument is not absolutely valid.¹⁵

c. Although it has frequently been observed that statives do not take the progressive form, this too is not entirely true. To the extent that this principle is violated, we have grounds to argue against the received opinion, according to which the reason why statives do not normally take the progressive morphology depends on the specific function of this morphological device, which allegedly consists in transforming a nonstative predicate into a stative one (cf. point [v] in section 2.1). Consider examples such as (20):

- (20) John is being silly tonight.

English is among the languages where the given restriction seems to be easily overcome: others are Brazilian Portuguese (Schmitz 1982), Tagalog (Smith 1983), and Japanese (Cziko and Koda 1987). Now, it might be objected that this is not a real issue, because we may claim that in such cases the verb is not used in a stative meaning. I sympathize with this view: I believe in fact that a given verb (considered as a lexicographic entry) may rather often have more than one meaning, that is, correspond to more than one lexical unity, each of which may have different actional properties. Indeed, this can easily be demonstrated on comparative

grounds: for example, *is silly* corresponds to It. *è scemo* (stative) while *is being silly* corresponds to *fa lo scemo* (nonstative). We might want to conclude from this that the progressive morphology can be used to destativize stative verbs: a proposal, needless to say, hardly compatible with the hypothesis of the equivalence between progressives and statives. In fact, the view suggested here is the exact reverse of the one advanced under point (v) of section 2.1; and this is what seems to happen in most instances like (20). However, it must also be acknowledged that there exists a small class of English stative predicates, including (mostly post-tural) verbs such as *stand*, *lie*, *live*, etc., which pose a serious problem to this view. These verbs admit of two different meanings (a permanent and a contingent/temporary one), vehicled by the simple and the progressive form respectively, which nevertheless are both intrinsically stative. Compare (21):

- (21) a. The statue stands in the park
 b. The statue is standing in the park [i.e. temporarily].¹⁶

Consequently, at least in this restricted set of cases, we have to conclude that some intrinsic statives are not allergic to the progressive morphology. Even more controversial is the situation to be observed in Japanese and Brazilian Portuguese, where the restriction on the progressive morphology with statives seems to be very weak (Schmitz 1982; Cziko and Koda 1987); Compare the following Portuguese examples:

- (22) a. João sabe a resposta
 b. João está sabendo a resposta [i.e. contingently, contrary to his normal behavior]
 'João knows the answer.'

In conclusion, we may agree upon the idea that, in the default case, the inadmissibility of the progressive morphology with stative verbs is a strong requirement and may be overridden only at the cost of destativizing the predicate. However, the degree to which languages obey this restriction varies considerably. If we were to construct a hierarchy, we would find languages like Italian in the first rank, for it is very hard to use the progressive "*stare* + gerund" periphrasis with statives (and whenever it happens, it inevitably brings about the destativization of the predicate). English occupies the next place, for it readily admits destativization with a rather large class of predicates (especially copular ones) and even exhibits a small subclass of predicates that preserve their stative character with the progressive morphology. Finally, Brazilian Portuguese and Japanese would presumably come last, for the class of intrinsically stative verbs that tolerate the progressive morphology is in both languages quite

substantial. This problem would deserve a thorough investigation on a broad typological basis, for it would contribute to further nuance the internal constitution of the class of statives, admittedly much more varied than often assumed (cf. point [iii] in section 2.2 and note 22).

d. Progressives of accomplishment verbs may combine with adverbs of "temporal graduality" such as *little by little* or *gradually*, whereas statives produce ungrammatical sentences. Remember that, as shown in (2), this type of adverb requires an accomplishment verb, while being neutral on aspectual grounds. Compare (23):

- (23) a. Little by little, the snow was covering the land.
b. *Little by little, John was hungry.

The reason for this discrepancy is straightforward, if one considers the fundamental properties of statives and progressives. The former refer to truly static situations and thus do not admit of adverbs indicating the gradual becoming of a telic event. The latter, on the contrary, present a dynamic situation in the course of its development and are therefore quite compatible with accomplishment predicates.¹⁷ This seems to be an unredeemable contrast between statives and progressives, and I believe that, despite all possible analogies that we may find, this is the fundamental semantic difference that separates the two entities under discussion here. Notice that my view is directly opposed here to Langacker's (1987: 85), who claims that progressives imply a situation which is "stable through time" (cf. again note 8 for a similar view of progressives advanced by Mittwoch).

2.4. Progressives vs. statives

Although not all the points examined in section 2.3 lead to a clear-cut differentiation, the considerations developed above enable us to draw some reasonably firm conclusions as to the supposed equivalence of progressives and statives. Admittedly, the only truly dichotomic criterion is the one based on adverbs of "temporal graduality." Nevertheless, the remaining criteria provide us with a scalar orientation, with progressives and statives pointing to opposite poles, as shown in the following prospect:

<i>density condition</i> <i>tolerance of habituality</i>	<i>stative verbs</i> usually valid usually good with contingent statives, although explicit adverbs of iteration are often required	<i>(nonstative) progressives</i> irrelevant usually poor, although with exceptions (more or less numerous, according to the language considered)
---	--	---

availability of the progressive morphology

usually excluded, although the strength of this requirement varies from language to language

obviously very high, this being the defining criterion (but remember that the semantic notion of "progressive" does not necessarily imply a specific morphological device)

Thus, although in most cases the contrast between statives and (nonstative) progressives does not appear to be established in a purely dichotomic manner, it is certainly a robust one in relative terms.

As a provisional conclusion to this section of the paper, I would therefore like to observe that although statives and progressives share some properties, they are on the whole quite distinct entities. As noted at the outset, the apparent convergence of statives and progressives in a number of situations is far from surprising, actually perfectly predicted in the theoretical framework advocated here. Given the fact that these categories belong to two different subdomains (actionality and aspect), nothing prevents their occurrence in the same contexts ([3b], [4a]).

It might be useful, however, to consider the fundamental ground for the analogies that have been repeatedly observed. The most likely explanations are the following:

– The progressive morphology of most (perhaps all) languages includes morphemes with locative, that is, inessive, meaning (cf. point [iii] in section 2.2). It is no wonder, then, that these two entities exhibit some basic similarity, due to the stative meaning of locative expressions. Obviously, as noted earlier, this observation does not imply that this is also true of the semantic notion "progressive," as distinct from the specific morphological device that is often employed to convey this meaning. But in languages like English and others, where the progressive periphrasis is the only way to instantiate this particular aspectual interpretation, the similarity is certainly enhanced.

– Statives are (–telic), while progressives, as is well known, have a contextually induced detelicizing effect (cf. again note 17). Consequently, in a number of cases statives and progressives show similar restrictions; witness the well-known "imperfective paradox" (cf. also the behavior with "in X Time" adverbs, as shown in [10]). Note, however, that the paths along which these admittedly similar effects are obtained differ considerably. In fact, statives are inherently atelic, whereas (nonstative) progressives may have a fundamentally telic meaning, provided the appropriate predicate is selected (i.e. accomplishments or achievements). Thus, even when the progressive morphology (or simply the progressive interpretation) is involved with a telic predicate, some of its relevant

properties are maintained, such as the compatibility with adverbs of "temporal graduality" shown by durative telics (i.e. accomplishments). In other words, even when contextually deteliced by the progressive interpretation, telic progressives retain a dynamic character that is totally precluded to statives.¹⁸

3. Habituals and statives

3.1. Introduction

Let us now turn to the second issue of this paper: the alleged identity of statives and habituals. I quoted above Mittwoch's (1988) opinion on this topic (see the comment to point [vii] in section 2.2). Among the other scholars making the same claim, we may cite Leech (1971), Mufwene (1984: 31–33), Partee (1984: 270), Chung and Timberlake (1985: 215), and Rot (1987). The source of this confusion lies perhaps in some remarks put forward by Vendler (1967), who writes that "generic" or "habitual" predicates, even when used with reference to a particular individual at a particular time, do not refer to the contingent properties of a given stage in the individual's life, but correspond to permanent attributes that characterize his being as a whole (cf. the notions of "stage-level" and "individual-level" predicates, as defined in Carlson 1981). Thus, *John sings* (said of a professional singer) qualifies permanently his entire image, although there are moments when he sings and moments when he does not.

Vendler is certainly right in claiming that this particular meaning is connected with that of stative verbs. Note, however, that his proposal is vitiated by the erroneous identification of habituals, broadly taken, with "generics" (or rather "attitudinal", as they are named in Bertinetto 1986).¹⁹ As I am going to show, there are several reasons for keeping them distinct. As claimed in Bertinetto (1986), attitudinal implement the specific kind of habituality accessible to eventive predicates (specifically activities, in Vendlerian terms) that are contextually turned into permanent statives, although they are nonstative in their default meaning (e.g. *sing*, *smoke*, *drink*). In other words, attitudinal may be viewed as the intersection of permanent statives (a subset of stative predicates) and habituals. To anticipate, the whole issue can be broken down as follows:

- statives, in general, do not behave like habituals, contrary to the received opinion;
- there is, however, a specific subclass of habituals, here called attitudi-

nals, that behave like a subclass of stative verbs, namely permanent statives;

- consequently, although the equivalence of habituals with statives, as proposed in the literature, should in general be rejected, it can be shown that it is valid with reference to a subset of habitual situations, namely attitudinal.

Obviously, this is a delicate theoretical issue: it might appear that I am here confusing an actional category (permanent stative predicates) with an aspectual one (attitudinal, as a subset of habituals). If this were really the case, I would violate the very principle stated at the outset, according to which we should not mix notions belonging to different domains. I shall clarify this point in section 3.4 below.

In order to substantiate my claim, let us first consider, as in section 2 of this paper, the main arguments for the analogy between habituals and statives, as well as some good reasons for keeping these two notions separate. Subsequently, I shall present evidence that the equivalence holds precisely in those cases that correspond to the "attitudinal" reading.

3.2. Analogies and divergences between habituals and statives

An often quoted, though unconvincing, reason for the identification of habituals and statives is the well-known fact that the English simple present may be used both with stative verbs and in habitual sentences.²⁰ Another morphological argument that has been advanced is the fact that both statives and past habits may occur in English in the *used to* construction. I cannot deal here, for lack of space, with the latter issue (but cf. Bertinetto i.p.b). I would just like to observe that the first of these morphologically based claims seems to create a rather paradoxical situation. As I mentioned under point (v) in section 2.1, the progressive morphology is regarded by some scholars as a stativizing tool, due to the fact that it cannot apply to verbs that are already stative. Now, if we also claim, in addition, that the English simple present is a relevant morphological link between habituals and statives, we are in fact saying that both the (present) progressive and the simple present are stativizing devices. The obvious conclusion is that, as I noted earlier, arguments relying too heavily on morphology (let alone on the morphology of a single language) inevitably lead to trouble.²¹

Brinton (1987: 197–198) mentions other possible arguments, including the fact that both statives and habituals (the latter more naturally than nonhabituals) may convey the meaning of a perfect of "persistent situa-

tion," in which the state of affairs referred to by the predicate also covers the speech point:

- (24) a. She has lived here since early childhood [=stative].
 b. He has played tennis for many years [=habitual].
 c. The child has coughed all night [=nonhabitual].

Interestingly, for some speakers, (24c) would preferably take the progressive form (*has been coughing*), according to a peculiar property of English (cf. again note 10). This would be quite welcome to those who believe in the equivalence of progressives and statives. Under such an assumption, (24) would manifest not only the similarity of statives and habituals, but also of both the latter with reference to progressives.

There are, however, some good reasons for keeping habituals and statives distinct. Brinton (1987: 199–201) again provides a few valuable suggestions. She observes, for instance, that habitual sentences may be modified by adverbs, or adjuncts, relating to the agentive control of the event, whereas stative sentences cannot be so modified:

- (25) a. Whenever he comes, John willingly/deliberately washes the dishes, in order to appear cooperative [=habitual].
 b. *John willingly/deliberately understands the matter [=stative].

This proves that habitual sentences may easily have a strictly eventive character, whereas stative verbs always refer to purely static situations.²²

Another argument is based on the possibility of anchoring the state of affairs to a single instant, which is possible for stative verbs when they are used in the progressive aspect (cf. [4] above and [30] below for additional qualifications), whereas it is obviously not possible with habituals, for the simple reason that they involve iteration:

- (26) a. *At the precise moment when John broke his leg, they used to eat dinner [=habitual].
 b. At the precise moment when John broke his leg, Ann was at work [=stative].

Admittedly, this does not prove that habituals are nonstative, but it shows nevertheless that they behave differently from nonhabitual stative predicates. Conversely, and in full agreement with the preceding observation, adverbials of numerical specification are compatible with habituals but not with permanent statives. Obviously, this argument concerns only this particular subset of stative predicates. However, since the equivalence posited between habituals and statives is claimed to be generally valid, the argument cannot be dismissed as irrelevant:

- (27) a. He always rings the bell three times [=habitual].
 b. *He is tall three times [=stative].

Again, this divergence may be circumvented with contingent statives by projecting the habit onto a recurrent pattern of events (e.g. *He is happy three times a day: at breakfast, at lunch, and at dinner time*). Note however that one needs to have an explicit indication of cyclicity (*three times a day*), whereas in (27a) this is not necessary (cf. once more note 14).

A further and very strong argument can be extracted from Zwarts (1989), who notes that only habituals, to the exclusion of statives, may occur in perceptual reports:

- (28) a. The witness saw the accused bring a present every day to the victim [=habitual].
 b. *The witness saw the accused hate the victim [=stative].

In the following section I shall return to this and other arguments presented above. Here I would like to recall a few additional reasons for disputing the identification of habituals and statives, some of which interestingly come from advocates of this claim. Mufwene (1984: 32–33), for instance, notes that in several Bantu languages habitual and nonhabitual statives are morphologically distinct; a fact that would hardly make sense if stativity and habituality coincided.²³ Similarly, several authors, among whom Chung and Timberlake (1985: 221–222), observe that although progressives may occasionally receive a habitual interpretation (as shown in [18a]), they often resist such a reading (as shown in [18b]). This is puzzling if one holds that progressives, habituals, and statives share the same basic features; but it is not if one holds instead that progressivity and habituality are distinct aspectual values, although related within the common subdomain of imperfectivity, whereas stativity is an actional category that may variously interact with these, or any other, aspectual values.

Indeed, the core of the problem lies in this fundamental categorical distinction, as is also put forward by Brinton (1987, 1988). But there is more to it, in my opinion. As I suggested earlier, there is a specific set of habitual situations, here called "attitudinals" (cf. note 19), that also constitutes a subset of permanent stative verbs. This is what I intend to show in the next section.

3.3 On the contrast between "pure" habituals and attitudinals

As claimed above, attitudinals form the intersection of habituals and permanent statives. If this claim is correct, we should be able to prove it

by applying to attitudinals the tests that are most crucial to permanent stativity. Correspondingly, we should also prove that nonattitudinal habituals differ from attitudinals in just this respect. To avoid misunderstanding, it is important to realize that in this section we deal with permanent statives, rather than statives in general: hence, the restrictions that I am going to discuss apply selectively to this particular subclass of stative predicates. However, to make things easier, I shall always include a comparison with contingent (or nonpermanent) statives. In addition, I shall from now on adopt a handy terminological distinction: I shall speak of attitudinals on the one hand and of "pure habituals" on the other, the latter being the complement class within the set of habituals (i.e. nonattitudinal habituals). Obviously, it should be kept in mind that my judgments of acceptability referring to attitudinals must be viewed with reference to this particular interpretation of the relevant predicates. As it happens, attitudinals may often also be interpreted as pure habituals: thus, a diacritic showing unacceptability as an attitudinal does not imply that the given predicate would be equally implausible as a pure habitual.

To start with, we may check whether attitudinals may be modified by temporal adverbs. As is well known, these are incompatible with permanent statives.²⁴

- (29) a. This morning, for a couple of hours, I was very angry with John [=contingent stative].
 b. *This morning, for a couple of hours, I was very tall [= permanent stative].
 c. *John sings for two hours [=attitudinal].
- (30) a. Right now, John is very happy [=contingent stative].
 b. *Right now, John is very tall [=permanent stative].
 c. *Right now, John sings [=attitudinal].

Given that permanent and contingent statives differ in this crucial respect, it is interesting to observe that attitudinals resemble the former type of predicates rather than the latter (cf. [29c], [30c]). This is a first hint that attitudinals differ from pure habituals precisely in a way that reflects the typical behavior of permanent statives. By this, however, I do not want to suggest that attitudinals do not express the habitual aspect. On the contrary, as I said earlier, they exhibit the particular form of habituality specifically accessible to predicates that are contextually turned into permanent statives; that is, predicates characterized by the fact that the (more or less) regular occurrence of a certain event is turned into a permanent property of a given individual (or set of individuals). Indeed, "attitudinal habituals" would be a better label for this class of predicates.

With this in mind, let us consider the following points of divergence between pure habituals and attitudinals:

- Pure habituals may combine with frequency adverbs, attitudinals cannot. Indeed,

- (31) John often/usually sings.

refers to the habit of the given individual, rather than to his profession; for that matter, this sentence may be said, for example, of a dentist or a driver. It might of course be said of a singer too; even then, however, one does not aim at characterizing his status, but (presumably) his success with the public.²⁵

- Pure habituals, as we noted in section 3.2 (cf. example [25]), easily tolerate the presence of expressions indicating agentivity, whereas statives are incompatible with them. Significantly, attitudinals behave like stative predicates:

- (32) a. *John willingly/deliberately sings [=attitudinal].
 b. John willingly/deliberately sings, whenever he comes [=pure habitual].

- Pure habituals may occur in perceptual reports, while this is not the case with attitudinals (cf. example [28]):

- (33) a. The witness saw the accused bringing a present every day to the victim [=pure habitual].
 b. *The witness saw the accused smoke [=attitudinal].

Indeed, (33b) is only possible with progressive meaning, or with purely habitual meaning, certainly not in the attitudinal sense corresponding to "being a smoker." This may be rationalized, in a formal way, under the assumption that attitudinals derive from eventive predicates through the loss of the *e* (i.e. "event") component, whereas pure habituals preserve it. For a formal assessment of attitudinals, see Lenci (in press), where it is claimed that these predicates are the result of a peculiar type of conversion, which superimposes a stative character onto their basic eventive nature. Thus, although they retain in some respect their inclination as activities (in Vendlerian terms), they ultimately behave like permanent statives. This accounts for the double nature of attitudinals. Indeed, on the one hand they suggest the iteration of the event referred to by the base predicate (in its default meaning); on the other hand, they do not necessarily imply that the event actually occurs (cf. *This engine works very quietly*, which can be said of an engine that has never been put to work yet).²⁶

To recapitulate, according to the view presented here attitudinals and

pure habitals are similar on aspectual grounds but differ in their actional properties, since the former behave like permanent statives, while the latter are eventive predicates. There still remains the need to clarify the intricate interplay of actionality and aspect to be observed with attitude-nals. To this I turn my attention in the next section.

3.4. The proper relation between pure habitals, attitude-nals, and statives

Once we realize that attitude-nals and pure habitals are different entities, although related from the aspectual point of view by their common membership in the category of habituality, the solution to our puzzle is at hand. Attitude-nals (unlike pure habitals) behave like statives for the simple reason that they are stative predicates, specifically of the permanent type, as shown in section 3.3. Indeed, all activity verbs that admit (in the relevant contexts) of an attitude-nal meaning are turned into stative predicates. It follows, then, that the often-repeated claim that habitals are stative holds with reference to this specific subset of habitual predicates. It is wrong, however, as demonstrated in section 3.2, when referred to the whole set of habitals, for the latter differ remarkably from statives (except, needless to say, for the properties they have in common with habitual statives; cf. example [3a]).

Although the interpretation of the linguistic data is straightforward, the delicate side of my proposal lies in the risk of conflating an actional category (permanent statives) with an aspectual one (the subset of habitals here called attitude-nals). Now, the crucial point to understand is the following. There is no way along which an originally permanent stative (such as *belong to a poor family*, *be tall*, and the like) may come to express the habitual aspect, because such predicates are strictly incompatible with the very idea of iteration of the event. The reclassification of activity verbs (like *sing*, *drink*, *smoke*, and the like) in terms of attitude-nals is the only conceivable interaction that we can find between the two categories in question: permanent stativity and habituality. This is in fact what happens: the iteration of an event (or simply the possibility that a certain event repeatedly occurs, as in the example of the engine working quietly, given at the end of section 3.3) becomes a permanent and static, that is, strictly noneventive, attribute of a given individual or object. This means that attitude-nals are a twofold entity: from the aspectual point of view, they share the basic properties of habitals; from the actional point of view, they share the same behavior of permanent statives. The sum of these characteristics is what makes them special.

But note that, although this is a rather peculiar case, it is not the only

instance of interaction of actionality and aspect. A very well known example is represented by the contextual detelicization of telic verbs that are used in the progressive aspect (cf. note 17). A parallel example is the destativization of stative verbs induced by the progressive morphology (cf. section 2.3). There is a difference, though. In the case of telic and stative verbs, a given actional class modifies to some extent its nature because of a specific aspectual value that interferes with its properties. In the case of attitude-nals, instead, the actional modification is concomitant with the implementation of the habitual interpretation. This is necessarily so, because all activity verbs that may receive an attitude-nal reading may also, in the appropriate contexts, take on a purely habitual reading (cf. for instance sentence [31]). Thus, the habitual aspect does not yield, in itself, the actional reclassification of the predicate; rather, the actional reclassification and the aspectual interpretation are simultaneously implemented.

Apart from this difference, the process of converting a nonstative predicate into a permanent stative one, via attitude-nality, is the exact reverse of the process that (when possible) destativizes statives by means of the progressive periphrasis (e.g. *John is being kind tonight*; cf. section 2.3 for more detail). This proves that this particular type of actional recategorization may go both ways. There exist both stative predicates susceptible of destativization (e.g. *be kind*), and nonstative predicates susceptible of stavization (e.g. *sing*). In both cases, the recategorization process involves a selection among the relevant class of predicates. Indeed, just as not all stative verbs are readily convertible into nonstative ones (as a consequence also of the varying propensity of each language to favor this type of transformation), it is also the case that not all nonstative verbs are equally liable to develop an attitude-nal meaning. This depends on the kind of event they refer to, which may be more or less typifying. For instance, while *sing*, *smoke*, *repair bicycles*, *eat a lot*, *write novels*, and the like may easily be conceived as attitude-nals, inasmuch as they can characterize the behavior and the whole being of a given individual, the same does not apply to *sharpen the pencil*, *build a fence*, *paint one's house*, and so on. Of course, in most cases it would be inappropriate to state that the attitude-nal meaning is strictly impossible; however, with the latter examples it is much more likely that the event, to the extent that it may be conceived as (more or less) regularly occurring, is viewed as purely habitual, rather than attitude-nal (cf. *John paints the house every time Aunt Mary comes*).

4. Conclusion

In conclusion, we may view the relationship between progressives, habitals, and statives as a truly triangular relationship. The first two categories

belong to the aspectual domain, whereas the latter belongs to the actonial domain. There is therefore a major categorical distinction between the first two and the latter. Nevertheless, these three entities present (pairwise) some sort of semantic proximity, which is often reflected in their syntactic behavior.

Thus, although progressivity and habituality are distinct notions, they may occasionally coexist in the same context, provided the relevant semantic requisites are met. This is shown for instance in example (18a), where the situation is presented as a series of regularly repeated pairs of events, where the second is viewed in progress at each moment at which the first occurs.

As to statives, we have seen in section 2 that, although they are fundamentally distinct from progressives, they may readily appear in progressive contexts. In addition to this, they also share some basic properties with progressives (as argued in section 2.4), so that the often claimed similarity of these two entities can receive justification, at least within limits. I have also claimed, in section 3, that there is a fundamental relationship between statives and attitudinals, for the latter are in fact a subset of permanent stative predicates. Apart from this peculiar case, however, it should be clear that statives must not be confused with pure habituals, despite some superficial affinity that might misleadingly suggest a thorough semantic equivalence.

Most importantly, it must be acknowledged that nothing prevents statives from combining, in the relevant contexts, with both the progressive and the habitual aspect, as well as with any other aspectual specification, as I have shown in example (3). The delicate interplay of the three notions under consideration here may best be appreciated by comparing examples such as *John is being silly tonight* (= [20]) and *John sings* in the attitudinal sense (= 'John is a singer'). In the former case, as already noted, the use of the progressive destativizes a verb that, in its most obvious meaning, is understood to be stative; in the latter, the attitudinal usage of a nonstative verb turns it into a stative predicate. Thus, the borders between these different situations are not sharp: in the appropriate contexts, we observe a sort of leakage from the one to the other. Nevertheless, it should be clear that these three notions do not coincide, due to the crucial divergences that divide them. By keeping actonial and aspectual categories separate, the interpretation of these facts appears to be straightforward, and the alleged identities dissolve, to the benefit of our comprehension of linguistic data.

Received 29 September 1993
Revised version received
10 May 1994
Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa

Notes

* This research was supported in part with fund 60% 1992, registered in my name, of the Ministero per l'Università e la Ricerca Scientifica e Tecnologica. I received useful suggestions from a number of people whom I would like to collectively thank here. Special thanks go to Denis Delfitto, with whom I discussed a primordial version of this paper. Correspondence address: Scuola Normale Superiore, Piazza dei Cavalieri n. 7, I-56126 Pisa, Italy.

1. I prefer to use this term, which is now becoming increasingly popular in the literature, rather than its German source *Aktionsart*.
2. See Bertinetto and Delfitto (1992). Note that I do not intend to suggest that the opposition "perfective"/"imperfective" should merely be reduced to the opposition bounded/unbounded: I am just saying that this is very often the case. In other words, the morphological distinction available to the Slavic verbal lexicon is primarily oriented toward the expression of actonial values and only secondarily exhibits aspectual values, especially when the latter do not have independent morphological devices at their disposal (as is the case in Russian as opposed to Bulgarian).

As an obvious consequence of what I have just said, it should be noted that the notions "perfective/imperfective," as they are met in the aspectual subdomain, are not coextensive with the homonymous formal categories encountered in Slavic languages. In this paper, I shall use these terms only in their purely aspectual meaning. As to the terms "telic/atelic," I shall use them as commonly intended in the literature, where telic verbs typically include accomplishments and achievements. Thus, telic and perfective should not be confused. The first term belongs to the actonial subdomain, ultimately to the lexical one, whereas the latter belongs to the aspectual subdomain. Except for the possible convergence to be observed in some languages (such as Russian, which, as said, lacks separate expressions for the categories of aspect and actionality), the notions of telic and perfective (just like atelic and imperfective) are vehicled by distinct devices. This entails that even the notion "tense-aspect system" is not very felicitous: "tense system" would be a more appropriate denomination. However, since this term has now become standard, I shall use it in this paper.

The dichotomy here proposed between "tense" and "temporal reference" corresponds to the distinction that other scholars express as "Tense" vs. "tense." Nothing essentially differentiates these two proposals, except perhaps the risk of misprints pending on the latter, due to the possible misuse of upper- and lowercase characters. I am obviously aware of the fact that most scholars admit the existence of both aspect and actionality as two separate categories, however they prefer to call them. It is nevertheless the case that, even among scholars who make the distinction, there may be occasional and undesirable mergings. A typical example is the frequent assertion that progressives are stative, or that habituals are stative. This is the specific topic that I am addressing in this paper.

A typical example of what appears to me as a categorical confusion is the assertion made by Herweg (1991: 363) that "perfective" and "imperfective" are synonymous, respectively, of "event sentence" and "state sentence." However, in the view defended here the perfective and imperfective aspects may just naturally apply to both events and states. An example of this, as applied to a state sentence, is example (3) discussed below.

5. Sentence (1d) may marginally be accepted in an intentional or prospective meaning. Note however that this would not necessarily be the case in other languages. Moreover,

the prospective reading would entail a different meaning of the adverbial (see below). It is appropriate to observe, in this connection, that there are at least three different meanings which can be attached to "in X Time":

- (i) duration of the event until completion (as in [1c]);
- (ii) duration of the preparatory phase preceding a more or less punctual event (as in *He left in one hour*);
- (iii) duration of the interval preceding inception in a new state (as in *In one hour, he was drunk*).

Meanings (i) and (ii) are quite close, inasmuch as they both involve the completion of a telic event (an accomplishment or an achievement, respectively). Meaning (iii) diverges because it does not imply completion, but rather inception. It may typically be found with atelic predicates and often meets with pragmatic restrictions. Note, in fact, that in this case the adverbial is best placed at the beginning of the sentence, rather than after the predicate. We shall find an example of meaning (iii) in example (10a) below. Sentence (1d) may also be interpreted in this way (i.e. Mary was due to begin her work in two hours). Alternatively, it may also be interpreted in a prospective sense (i.e. the expectation was that in two hours Mary would finish the work that she was doing). The latter interpretation would arise much more naturally with activities whose duration may be to some extent measured, as in *Ben Johnson was running the 100 meters in less than 10 seconds, when he was interrupted by a muscular accident*. In this example, one may assume that the speed of the athlete until the interruption was such that a similar prediction could reasonably be made.

6. And consider again the case of Slavic languages of the type of Russian, alluded to in note 2, where the notions of aspect and actionality are not distinguished on morphological grounds.
7. The claim that progressives and habituals are stative is often substantiated with some peculiar properties of the English morphology. On the one hand, we find a formal resemblance between some stative predicates and the progressive (cf. *John is tired/sleeping*). On the other hand, the English simple present tends to have a habitual/generic meaning. In both cases, one may claim that the English present captures some essential similarity. However, these observations are less crucial than supposed. As to the former claim, the formal resemblance vanishes entirely as soon as we select a different stative predicate, such as *possess*, unless one wants to suggest that *is sleeping* is itself a simple present rather than a present progressive (as commonly assumed in any standard grammar of English). As to the latter claim, I would like to observe that the English simple present does not invariably convey a habitual/generic reading, as witnessed by performatives, reportive usages, recipe instructions, stage directions, and the like. But most of all, it must be understood that a well-rooted theory of tense-aspect semantics should not be tailored to the idiosyncratic morphological properties of a single language. Note, for example, that in Romance languages it is normally not necessary to select the progressive morphology in order to convey a progressive reading: any tense with a basic imperfective meaning, such as the present or the imperfect, may easily receive a progressive interpretation (or, for that matter, a habitual one) in the relevant contexts.

It is appropriate to observe, in this connection, that although in this paper I may give the impression that I equate the semantic notion "progressive" with a morphological device of some sort (different from language to language), this is clearly not the case. I mostly refer to the progressive morphology simply because that is the only way that English has at its disposal to render this aspectual value. A full-fledged theory of

the progressive must obviously take a broader view. More generally, any theory that relies too heavily on morphology is bound to fail, because of counterevidence from other languages.

In addition to the two claims referred to above, it is also suggested, as a further morphological argument, that stative verbs normally do not take the progressive morphology. Inasmuch as this is true of most languages (although to a varying degree), this does not specifically refer to English. In any case, I shall deal with this in sections 2.1–2.3.

8. According to Mittwoch, progressives may be compared to a still in a motion picture; in this sense they are regarded as static. A somewhat similar view is put forth by Berrettoni (1982), who considers progressives as both static and dynamic, in that they provide a static localization contained within the dynamic process of the event.

It is interesting to observe, however, that while progressives normally entail the localization of a single instant, in which the event is viewed in the course of its development, statives usually resist such an interpretation, unless they belong to the small subclass of stative predicates that apply at an instant, like *to be 5 o'clock* (see the discussion of example [14] below).

9. Note that in some languages, such as Italian, French, or German, the equivalent of (8c) would be acceptable. This is due to the fact that, in perfective contexts, the adverbs corresponding to *still* (It. *ancora*, Fr. *encore*, Germ. *noch*) undergo a thorough semantic restructuring, which turns them into adverbs of iteration, roughly meaning 'again'. However, this meaning is clearly distinct from the one available to imperfective contexts, such as (8a)–(8b). The fact that English (or, to cite another case, Spanish) does not allow such a resemanticization proves that this adverb type has a basic imperfective meaning, while the alternative perfective (specifically, iterative) meaning is a subsidiary one.

10. Although (9c) is not regarded as ungrammatical by some speakers, (9b) is much preferred. This is a peculiarity of English, depending on restrictions that need not concern us here. Note, however, that the parallel behavior of progressives and statives, with this particular reading of the adverbial (where it is assumed that the event also embraces the point of reference), is restricted to compound tenses. By way of contrast, consider the simple tenses in the following sentences:

- (i) John was here for two hours.
- (ii) ?John was working for two hours.
- (iii) John worked for two hours.

In this case, the equivalence is between the stative verb in (i) and the simple past in (iii), rather than between (i) and the progressive in (ii) (which is acceptable only in a prospective meaning, anchored to a moment in the past, rather than in a true progressive meaning; cf. note 5).

11. The plausibility of such reading may depend on the particular predicate employed. Indeed, this reading would be easier to obtain with *livid* instead of *angry*. This is because, as James Pustejovsky pointed out to me (personal communication), *livid* is more likely to receive a "resultative" meaning, of the sort that we may find in *Mary wiped the table clean*. On the contrary, *angry* is more likely to be interpreted as a purely descriptive adjective.

Curiously, Dowty (1986: 56) makes the opposite claim, that progressives (and not statives) may, in the appropriate contexts, exhibit an inceptive reading. Unfortunately, Dowty's example (38), reproduced here as (i), only proves (at best) that in the given

context both the progressive (*was offering*) and the stative verb (*she knew*) may receive an inceptive reading:

- (i) (= Dowty's [38]) The president began the interview in a coldly official manner, much as Mary expected. But the next thing she knew, the president was offering her the ambassador post.

A more parsimonious interpretation would be that the punctual reading of *knew* in the given context suggests a sudden advancement of the narration, as though there were a sudden recovery of consciousness by Mary, after a moment of absent-mindedness. In other words, what we perceive is a sort of jump in the narration line. If viewed in this way, it becomes clear that the progressive here displays its usual function: once we have identified the moment of time referred to (which is located somewhat after the event indicated by *began*), we may construe the act of offering as occurring at that precise moment.

As to Smith (1983), it should be remarked that she apparently accepts as normal sentences like the following:

- (ii) Helen promised to go before she was angry.
(iii) John went to Africa after he knew Hausa.

which are contrasted with analogous, but clearly ungrammatical, sentences containing progressives instead of statives. However, I would hesitate to claim that this indicates a salient difference between progressives and statives, because sentences like (ii)–(iii) appear to be quite marginal.

12. This statement needs some qualification. In the Italian translation of (12b) it would be impossible to use the preterite (**Gianni fu/è stato arrabbiato quando Maria ha lasciato cadere il bicchiere del brandy*). To express this meaning, one should select the appropriate predicate, such as *divenne arrabbiato* or *si arrabbiò*. However, it is clearly the case that the imperfect (*era arrabbiato*) cannot convey the inceptive meaning available to (12b). In order to obtain this result, one should definitely choose "resultative" adjectives, such as *livido*, *furente*, or the like (cf. note 11).

13. Consider, for example, the impossibility of applying the Italian periphrasis "*andare* + Gerund" to the verb *andare* and its derivatives: **La situazione va andando di bene in meglio* 'the situation is getting better and better' (as opposed to *La situazione va migliorando* 'the situation is improving'). This restriction, however, is not absolute; compare Sp. *Anda andando!* 'Be going!'
14. It should also be noted that progressives with habitual meaning are more easily found in English than in Romance languages. Consider the following sentences, reported in Brinton (1988: 40):

- (i) More and more people are buying television sets.
(ii) They are visiting us less and less often.
(iii) He is always saying the wrong things.
(iv) That child is continually getting into trouble.

The last two sentences, in particular, would sound utterly odd in a literal translation preserving the progressive morphology. It is interesting to observe that these two sentences are rather close to a particular version of habituality, which in the next section I shall denominate "attitudinal."

Note further that according to some scholars, such as Brinton (1987), statives are not allowed in habitual sentences. If this were the case, it would add to the list of possible resemblances between statives and progressives. However, things are more

subtle. Kleiber (1987), for instance, takes an intermediate position, suggesting that statives may have a habitual reading only when accompanied by an explicit indication of iteration of the state of affairs, such as *often*, *regularly*, and the like. The claim is substantially correct, but it should be further attenuated. As Bertinetto (1986: 186–187) observes, we do occasionally find stative verbs with habitual meaning even in the absence of explicit adverbials, as in (i):

- (i) L'arrivo della zia Maria implicava una rivoluzione nella nostra vita familiare. Ogni volta occorreva trovarle una stanza.
'The arrival of aunt Mary meant a revolution in our family life. Every time it was necessary to find her a room.'

Moreover, not all nonstative verbs are equally susceptible of a habitual reading, as is shown by the following sentence, which sounds much more natural with the adverb than without:

- (ii) In quel periodo andavo (spesso) fino ai limiti del bosco.
'At that time I (often) went to the edge of the forest.'

Thus, the difference between statives and nonstatives, with reference to habituality, is smaller than it might at first sight appear.

15. One referee observes that even substituting *sick* for *hungry* in (19a) would yield this result, in the sense that John could have brief respites over a time of severe disease. I disagree on this specific suggestion, especially because it seems to mix two different stative situations (*be sick* and *be very sick*), which are clearly different. However, I would be ready to admit that very much depends on how broad the temporal window is. Although it is unlikely that *be sick between 2 and 3* allows for interruptions, this is less likely to be the case with, for example, *be sick between January 1985 and June 1994*.

Vlach (1981) assumes a rather peculiar position in this connection. His definition of stative predicates (1981: 275), provided in connection with the sentence *Max has been here for an hour*, is as follows:

- (i) The sentence ϕ is true for the interval I if and only if ϕ is true at a set of subintervals of I which are more or less scattered all over I in such a way that there are no large gaps between the subintervals of I at which ϕ is true.

This is rather counterintuitive in the case given. Presumably, the reason for proposing this formulation is that Vlach wants to take care of sentences such as *Is someone sitting here?* (1981: 280), which are likely to be uttered in the absence of the person referred to (remember that for this author progressives are stative predicates). In my opinion, the definition suggested by Vlach is better suited for activity predicates than for statives, although there may be instances for which it is appropriate, as noted in the discussion of point (b) in this section.

16. C. Vet has pointed out to me an example originally proposed by D. R. Dowty, which is remarkable for the reason that the progressive morphology not only leaves intact the stative meaning of the predicate but also fails to convey the idea of temporariness. Presumably, this is an exception, but not without interest:

- (i) John entered the room. The president was sitting as usual at his desk.

17. This statement needs some qualification. First, as is well known (remember the so-called "imperfective paradox"), progressives entail a detelicization of telic verbs. Now, accomplishments are a subset of telic verbs. However, in such cases it would be more appropriate to speak of "contextually induced detelicization," which does not obliterate the intrinsic telic character of the predicate. Indeed, from (23a) we gather

that the process of the snow covering the land was gradually developing toward its conceivable goal, although it is quite possible that the goal itself was not reached.

Second, it should be observed that in English the progressive periphrasis may occur with truly stative verbs, expressing temporariness rather than dynamic development (cf. 21 above). Obviously, in these marginal cases the adverbs of temporal graduality are not admitted, for independent reasons.

Third, it should be noted that accomplishments are the only major actional class compatible with adverbs of "temporal graduality." The contrast with achievements ("John is gradually leaving") and activities ("John is gradually dancing"), besides statives (cf. [23b]) is striking (Bertinetto and Delfitto 1992). However, this does not weaken my conclusion because, in order to sustain my claim that progressives and statives do not coincide, it is enough to show that this type of adverb is compatible with at least one relevant type of progressive sentence and always incompatible with statives. On the peculiar behavior of adverbs of "temporal graduality," see also Bertinetto and Squartini (i.p.).

One referee observes that substituting *increasingly* for *little by little* in (23b) would yield a grammatical sentence. I agree on this. The reason is that the former adverb barely refers to quantity and is in fact used as an intensifier (indeed, one may be more or less hungry). The latter type of adverb, on the other hand, refers to the time dimension and as such cannot be employed with inherently static predicates. In other words, although both adverbs measure a quantity, only the latter type conflicts with a crucial property of stative predicates: their lack of development over time. For additional observations on these two similar, but not identical, classes of adverbs, see Bertinetto (i.p.a).

18. Equally relevant to our present concern is the behavior of achievements with progressive interpretation. Delfitto and Bertinetto (i.p.) show that the progressive, when applied to these predicates, entails special consequences. Lack of space prevents me from going into details.

19. In this paper I shall use the term "attitudinals" rather than "generics," because I believe it is more appropriate in this context. The latter label may also be used for sentences such as *Dogs have four legs*, which obviously have nothing to do with habitual sentences. On the contrary, *John sings*, even if taken in its purely attitudinal sense, bears some obvious relation to the habitual reading. In fact, although the quality of being a singer persists even when the individual in question is silent, we would not normally attribute this property to a person, unless there have been previous occasions of singing. Generics, on the other hand, although themselves a subset of permanent statives, have nothing in common with habituals. We can summarize things as follows: both generics and attitudinals are subsets of permanent statives, but only the latter are, at the same time, a subset of habitual situations.

20. Besides the objections raised against this point in note 7, it is worth insisting that this behavior, although presumably not exclusive of English, is rather restricted. For some interesting data concerning the tenses used to express pure iterativity, habituality, and genericity (cf. note 19) in various languages, see Dahl (1988). One relevant piece of information is that, apparently, there are no languages in which the devices conveying generic meaning cannot also convey a habitual meaning, although the reverse seems to occur in a few cases.

21. Indeed, far from being a stativizing device, the progressive morphology often works as a destativizing tool, as observed in section 2.3.

22. Obviously, if habituality and stativity combine, as in (3a), the restriction concerning agentive adverbs holds despite the habitual value, since it is impossible for stative predicates to overcome it. However, here I am contrasting, for the sake of the argument, nonstative habituals with statives, just as in section 2 I contrasted statives with

nonstative progressives.

It is appropriate to observe that, although the restriction that bars agentive expressions from stative contexts is generally valid, there are marginal exceptions. A notable one concerns predicates such as *stare seduto* 'sit', *stare sdraiato* 'lie', *stare in piedi* 'stand', etc. (note that, significantly, these are all postural verbs, like most of the English predicates showing deviant behavior with reference to the progressive morphology, as remarked in section 2.3). As it happens, these verbs allow for the imperative and for agentive adverbs (cf. *Sia fermo!* 'do not move!', *Gianni stava deliberatamente seduto* 'G. remained deliberately seated'). As the translations make clear, these predicates are not prototypical statives: in fact, they involve the voluntary control of the body posture. Yet, they do not take the progressive form. In Bertinetto (1986) it is proposed that they form a special subclass of statives, alongside other subclasses. Thus, it should be realized that besides prototypical statives, there are peripheral subsets of predicates exhibiting peculiar properties. In this paper, I obviously limit myself to prototypical statives, which make up the vast majority of the class in question.

23. One referee observes that this only proves that in such Bantu languages habituals do not coincide entirely with statives, but it does not rule out the possibility that they are a special type of statives. Although I think this is unlikely, given the amount of converging evidence gathered on the matter, I admit that this is logically conceivable. If the present evidence were the only sort available, it would certainly be inconclusive. Note that even with contingent statives it may sometimes be difficult to find a suitable context for strictly delimiting temporal adverbs, such as *from 3 to 5 o'clock*, *for two hours*, and the like. This is because a stative situation is often difficult to associate with the idea of a precise beginning or end of the given state of affairs. Nevertheless, at least with more vague temporal delimitations, such as *during the morning class*, *last Friday*, and so on, contingent statives may readily be used.

24. A similar claim is put forward by Dahl (1985) with respect to generic sentences, which are not compatible with frequency adverbs (cf. again note 19 for the relation between generics and attitudinals). Note, by the way, that frequency adverbs readily combine with contingent statives, to the exclusion of permanent ones:

- (i) John is often sad [= contingent stative].
- (ii) *John is often short-legged [= permanent stative].

This is further proof that attitudinals are indeed permanent statives.

25. As a further difference between attitudinals and pure habituals, we might add the fact that pure habituals may easily be passivized, while attitudinals often meet with difficulties. Consider (i):

- (i) a. A party was organized every evening [= pure habitual].
- b. ??Nasty cigars were smoked by John [= attitudinal].
- c. Dams are built by beavers [= attitudinal ??].

One possible explanation of the difficulty encountered by the attitudinal in (b), as compared to the pure habitual in (a) and the alleged attitudinal in (c), is that attitudinality creates a special relationship between a subject and a predicate, in as much as the latter provides a constant characterization of the subject. The syntactic demotion of the subject produced by passivization destroys this relationship, often giving rise to ungrammaticality. In fact, even (c) may be considered inappropriate, because this statement would hardly be taken as generally valid for any instantiation of the entity 'dam'. This observation is even more compelling in languages like Italian, where the

direct object of attitudinals tends to be built without the article, and where bare plurals may appear in subject position only under severe restrictions:

- (ii) a. Giovanni fuma sigari pestilenziali.
'G. smokes nasty cigars.'
- b. ??Sigari pestilenziali sono fumati da Giovanni.
(Nasty cigars are smoked by G.)

Habituals, on the other hand, insist on the (more or less) regular iteration of the event, without attributing any special status to the subject. In other words, with pure habituals the focus is on the event itself, viewed as an iterated process; with attitudinals the focus is on the subject and its peculiar relationship to the predicate.

References

- Berrettoni, Pierangiolo (1982). Aspetto verbale e viaggi temporali. Sul contenuto semantico dell'aspetto progressivo. *Studi e Saggi Linguistici* 23, 49–114.
- Bertinetto, Pier Marco (1980). Nuovamente sull'imperfetto narrativo. *Lingua Nostra* 41, 83–89.
- (1986). *Tempo, Aspetto e Azione nel verbo italiano. Il sistema dell'indicativo*. Florence: Accademia della Crusca.
- (i.p.a). Verso una definizione della perifrasi "continua" (*andare/venire* + Gerundio). In *Miscellanea in memoriam di Adriana Quattordio Moreschini* (provisional title).
- (i.p.b). Le perifrasi abituali in italiano ed in inglese. In *Miscellanea in memoriam di Luigi Rosiello* (provisional title).
- ; and Delfitto, Denis (1992). Aspect vs. actionality: some reasons for keeping them apart. *Eurotyp Working Papers* 6(1), 1–28.
- ; and Squartini, Mario (i.p.). An attempt at defining the class of gradual completion verbs. In *Temporal Reference, Aspect and Actionality*, vol. 1: *Syntactic and Semantic Perspectives*, Valentina Bianchi, Pier Marco Bertinetto, James Higginbotham, and Mario Squartini (eds.). Turin: Rosenberg and Sellier.
- Brinton, Laurel J. (1987). The aspectual nature of states and habits. *Folia Linguistica* 21, 195–214.
- (1988). *The Development of English Aspectual Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Carlson, Lauri (1981). Aspects and quantification. In *Tense and Aspect*, Philip Tedeschi and Annie Zaenen (eds.), 31–64. Syntax and Semantics 14. New York: Academic Press.
- Castelnovo, Walter (1993). Progressive and actionality in Italian. *Rivista di Linguistica* 5, 3–30.
- Chung, Sandra; and Timberlake, Alan H. (1985). Tense, aspect and mood. In *Language Typology and Syntactic Description. Grammatical Categories and the Lexicon*. Timothy Shopen (ed.), 202–258. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cohen, David (1989). *L'aspect verbal*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- Comrie, Bernard (1976). *Aspect*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (1985). *Tense*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cziko, Gary A.; and Koda, Keiko (1987). A Japanese child's use of stative and punctual verbs. *Journal of Child Language* 14, 99–111.
- Dahl, Östen (1985). Remarques sur les génériques. *Languages* 79, 55–60.
- (1988). The expression of the episodic-generic distinction in tense-aspect systems. In

- Genericity in Natural Language*, Manfred Krifka (ed.), 95–105. Proceedings of the 1988 Tübingen Conference, Seminar für natürlich-sprachliche Systeme der Universität Tübingen. Tübingen: Universität Tübingen.
- Delfitto, Denis; and Bertinetto, Pier Marco (i.p.). A case study in the interaction of aspect and actionality: the imperfect in Italian. In *Temporal Reference, Aspect and Actionality*, vol. 1: *Syntactic and Semantic Perspectives*, Valentina Bianchi, Pier Marco Bertinetto, James Higginbotham, and Mario Squartini (eds.). Turin: Rosenberg and Sellier.
- Dowty, David R. (1986). The effects of aspectual class on the temporal structure of discourse: semantics or pragmatics? *Linguistics and Philosophy* 9, 37–61.
- Ebert, Karen (i.p.). Ambiguous perfect-progressive forms across languages. In *Temporal Reference, Aspect and Actionality*, vol. 2: *Typological Perspectives*, Valentina Bianchi, Pier Marco Bertinetto, Östen Dahl, and Mario Squartini (eds.). Turin: Rosenberg and Sellier.
- Gabbay, D.; and Moravcsik, M. E. (1980). Verb, events and the flow of time. In *Time, Tense and Quantifiers*, Christian Rohrer (ed.), 59–83. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
- Gebert, Lucyna (i.p.). Imperfectives as expressions of states. In *Temporal Reference, Aspect and Actionality*, vol. 2: *Typological Perspectives*, Valentina Bianchi, Pier Marco Bertinetto, Östen Dahl, and Mario Squartini (eds.). Turin: Rosenberg and Sellier.
- Hatav, Galia (1989). Aspects, Aktionsarten, and the time line. *Linguistics* 27, 487–516.
- Heweg, Michael (1991). A critical examination of two classical approaches to aspect. *Journal of Semantics* 8, 363–402.
- Kleiber, Georges (1987). *Du côté de la référence verbale. Les phrases habituelles*. Berne: Lang.
- Langacker, Ronald W. (1987). Nouns and verbs. *Language* 63, 53–94.
- Leech, Geoffrey (1971). *Meaning and the English Verb*. London: Longman.
- Lenci, Alessandro (i.p.). The semantic representation of non-quantificational habituals. In *Temporal Reference, Aspect and Actionality*, vol. 1: *Syntactic and Semantic Perspectives*, Valentina Bianchi, Pier Marco Bertinetto, James Higginbotham, and Mario Squartini (eds.). Turin: Rosenberg and Sellier.
- Mittwoch, Anita (1988). Aspects of English aspect: on the interaction of perfect, progressive and durative phrases. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 11, 203–254.
- Mufwene, Salikoko S. (1984). *Stativity and the Progressive*. Bloomington: Indiana University Linguistics Club.
- Parsons, Terence (1989). The progressive in English: events, states and processes. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 12, 213–241.
- Partee, Barbara H. (1984). Nominal and temporal anaphora. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 7, 243–286.
- Rot, S. (1987). On aspect-tense-temporal reference in present-day English. *Acta Linguistica* 37, 143–168.
- Sauer, Werner (1984). *A Formal Semantics of Tense, Aspect, and Aktionsart*. Bloomington: Indiana University Linguistics Club.
- Schmitz, J. R. (1982). The progressive construction and stativeness in Brazilian Portuguese. In *Current Research in Romance Languages*, James P. Lantolf and Gregory B. Stone (eds.), 145–156. Bloomington: Indiana University Linguistics Club.
- Smith, Carola (1983). A theory of aspect choice. *Language* 59, 479–501.
- Vendler, Zeno (1967). Verbs and times. In *Linguistics in Philosophy*, 97–121. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Vlach, Frans (1981). The semantics of the progressive. In *Tense and Aspect*, Philip Tedeschi and Annie Zaenen (eds.), 271–292. Syntax and Semantics 14. New York: Academic Press.
- (1993). Temporal adverbs, tenses and the perfect. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 16, 231–283.
- Zwarts, Joost (1989). Statives and habituals. In *OTS Yearbook 1989*, Peter Coopmans, Bert Schouten, and Wim Zonneveld (eds.), 101–111. Dordrecht: Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht.