This paper discusses different degrees of lexical/grammatical evidentiality. I show that the specific function of evidential parecer constructions is linked to the grammatical or lexical status of the verb. The data suggest that there is a correlation between the continuum from lexical to grammatical, on the one hand, and the modes of knowing expressed, on the other. It is shown that the higher the degree of grammaticalization of a parecer construction is, the less evidential values it can express. A series of functional-pragmatic tests indicate that the parece que construction involves a broader array of evidential types than both me/le parece que and parecer + infinitive. These two constructions can be considered the lexical and the grammatical endpoints of the continuum, respectively. The tests confirm the claim that me/le parece que is attached to the conceptualizer, whereas the grammaticalized parecer + infinitive construction conveys an inferential qualification that is restricted to the speaker.

The concept of (inter)subjectivity is presented as a useful addition to source-evidentiality. Subjectivity refers to the speaker’s exclusive access to the evidence, whereas intersubjectivity is about shared access to the evidence. The intersubjective statements, here expressed by parece que, are considered to have broader support than the subjective ones conveyed by parecer + infinitive. They can be seen as more reliable and, hence, can explain why the Hispanic linguistic literature labels them as expressing “near-factivity”, while subjective statements, based on the speaker’s inference only, lead to a “non-factive” interpretation.

Thus, the different distribution of the evidential readings with parecer gives a more delicate analysis of the different evidential values of lexical and grammatical expressions.

1. Introduction

This paper discusses both grammatical and lexical uses of Spanish parecer. By doing so, the approach differs from Aikhenvald’s (2004) claim that evidentiality should refer to an exclusively grammatical, obligatory category of a language. Following this view would entail that evidentiality can not be considered from a functional perspective and would imply that most European languages do not have an evidential category.

Although Aikhenvald’s position has, at first sight, the advantage of being clear, her account seems to be based on a dichotomous view
of grammar and lexicon, which contrasts with the idea of a continuum argued for in the studies on grammaticalization of the last twenty years. An alternative, functional approach to the evidential expressions should then take into account the degree of grammaticalization that characterizes them. An integrated account of both grammatical and lexical evidentiality can contribute to a better understanding of the whole domain (cf. Squartini in press).

Below I will argue that there is a continuum between lexical and grammatical constructions with parecer. The claim is that the lexical and grammatical endpoints of the continuum are related to specific evidential types, whereas constructions that occupy a position in between can combine several evidential types.

The synchronic and diachronic data used in this paper come from the Corpus del español (compiled by Mark Davies). This internet corpus contains peninsular and Latin American Spanish in both spoken and written form. Cornillie (2004: Chap. 1 and 2, 2007) gives an overview of the frequency distribution of parecer and other evidential verbs in the Corpus del español.

The paper is organized as follows. I first present the sentential complementation with parecer in Section 1. In Section 2, I scrutinize the sources of information or modes of knowing used for an evidential statement and explain how they relate to intersubjectivity. In Sections 3 and 4, these dimensions are analyzed in various constructions with parecer.

2. Constructions of parecer

The verb parecer shows up with nominal, adjectival and sentential complements. As for the latter, the infinitive (1a) and the que-clause (1b-c) are the most frequent ones. Furthermore, parecer has also a parenthetical use, e.g. (1d). Unlike the other constructions, parecer then does not introduce a clause, but goes inserted in or comes after the clause.

(1) a. Las condiciones del tratado parecen irritar a los diplomáticos.
   ‘The conditions of the treaty seem to irritate the diplomats.’

   b. Parece (ser) que las condiciones del tratado los irritan.
      ‘It seems (to be) that the conditions of the treaty irritate them.’

   c. Me parece que las condiciones del tratado los irritan.
      ‘It seems to me that the conditions of the treaty irritate them.’

   d. Las condiciones del tratado, parece, los irritan.
      ‘The conditions of the treaty, it seems, irritate them.’
The continuum between lexical and grammatical evidentiality

The *parecer* constructions can be situated on a grammaticalization scale. From a diachronic point of view, *me parece que* (2) and *parece que* (3) precede *parecer + infinitive* (4) (see also de Haan, this volume for Germanic equivalents). Interestingly, in the early stages the former combine with all kinds of verbs in the *que*-clause, while the latter is restricted to copular infinitives.

(2) ... a todos los altos hombres que eran ay: & dixo les assi. Amigos este combatiport no *me parece que* nos aprouecha: ca a ellos no podemos fazer daño. (Anonymous. *Gran conquista de Ultramar*. 13th century)

‘To all these important people who were there: and I told them like this. Friends, it does not seem to me that this fighting serves us, because we cannot hurt these men.’

(3) El huesped fue & mucho alegre quando entendio estas palauras [...] pues *parese que* aquell cauallero era ally quando que vos fuistes librado dela mala prision. (Anonymous. *Cuento de Tristán de Leonís*. 14th century)

‘The host was really happy when he heard these words; well it seems that this knight was there when you were liberated from the bad prison.’

(4) ... por ende la maldat le aconpaña sienpre, perdida la bondat. Al junco e al carrizo el tal es conparado, que *parece ser* verde e todo es desecado: fuera tiene frescura, con que ha engañado la vista de los omnes que lo tengan provado. (López de Ayala, Canciller Pedro. *Libro Rimado de Palacio*. 1380)

‘Finally the badness always accompanies, once the goodness is lost. One can compare it with reeds, which seem to be green and [but] all are dried out: from the outside they have a fresh look, with which they have misled the view of the people that have tasted them.’

In the corpus, the same type of color adjectives as *verde* in (4) frequently appears in combination with *parecer*. The copular infinitives with *parecer + infinitive* suggest then that the new construction originates from *parecer + adjective* (cf. Cornillie 2004 chap 6, 2008, for a different account see Bolinger 1991). From the 15th century on, the group of infinitives that combines with *parecer* steadily grew. The major extension is observed towards the end of the 19th century. In the evolution to greater auxiliarlihood, *parecer* lost its perfect tense, which is still available with *(me) parece que*. Moreover, *parecer* easily shows up in the same syntactic slot as the modal verbs *poder* ‘may’, *deber* ‘must’ or *tener que* ‘have to’.
Let us now look at *me parece que*. In the 13th century, this construction outnumbered *parece que*. *Me parece que* conveys a further lexical specification of the conceptualizer, which can vary in person and number. Interestingly, the *me parece que* construction retains the original reading of appearance more than *parece que*, and can, hence, be considered purely lexical.

Finally, parenthetical expressions such as *por lo que parece* and *según parece* may be considered grammaticalized due to their formulaic use and their tense restrictions, but as far as their syntactic relation with the main predicate of the proposition is concerned, the grammatical role of the parentheticals is limited. In other words, parentheticals cannot easily be analyzed in terms of grammaticalization of the complementation.

3. **Evidentiality: modes of knowing and (inter)subjectivity**

Let us now turn to evidentiality and present how this notion is understood in this paper. Evidentiality is considered to have two dimensions: the reference to the epistemological basis for a statement (modes of knowing, which are often referred to as sources of information), on the one hand, and, on the other, the shared or unshared status of the evidence (intersubjectivity) (cf. Cornillie 2004, 2007). A similar view, with a different terminology, is held by Squartini (2004, in press).

3.1. **Evidentiality: a typology**

In the 1980s, several typologies of evidentiality were brought to the fore. I will briefly mention two of them, namely Chafe (1986) and Willett (1988).

Chafe’s (1986) functional classification differentiates between several sources of knowledge, i.e. (i) no source, (ii) evidence, (iii) language and (iv) hypothesis, which he connects to four modes of knowing: (i) belief, (ii) induction, (iii) hearsay and (iv) deduction. Since Chafe’s view of evidentiality is functional in nature, his typology includes lexical expressions, such as adverbs and mental state verbs. This paper follows a similar functional approach.

Willett’s (1988) cross-linguistic typology of evidential types distinguishes between evidentials referring to direct – or attested – evidence, on the one hand, and evidentials that refer to indirect evidence, on the other. The direct source of information can be visual, auditory
The continuum between lexical and grammatical evidentiality or contain other sensory information. The indirect type of information is further subdivided into reported information (secondhand, third-hand, folklore) and speaker-oriented inferential statements (from reasoning or results). Since the evidence is often direct, the indirect label then refers to the speaker’s conclusion. Although the inferential statement is produced on the basis of a concrete stimulus, it takes place “without any indication of what the nature of the evidence was” (Chafe 1986:266). In other words, the visual, auditory or other evidence used for an inference necessarily remains “unspecified”.

The foregoing classifications are still a valid tool and show up in much of the work on evidentiality of the last decades. This is also the case of Aikhenvald’s (2004) typological account of evidentiality. The focus of her account is on the extent to which languages combine different evidential values. Some languages combine only two types of markers (first hand and non-first hand, or reported vs ‘everything else’), whereas other languages combine up to five different types of evidentials (cf. Aikhenvald 2004:25-36). In Spanish, the functional category of evidentiality is mainly restricted to hearsay and inference. In line with Chafe, I also use the term ‘Belief’ for the mode of knowing for which no source of information is available, that is when there is no induction from direct evidence. Note that “Belief” expressions are not always strictly speaking evidential: they can either convey an epistemic qualification or function as a hedge with a subjectifier function. Finally, direct evidence as such will not be addressed since it is expressed by perception verbs in Spanish.

3.2. (Inter)subjectivity

I will now complement the dimension of source-evidentiality with the interactional dimension of (inter)subjectivity. The term intersubjectivity was first used in modern linguistics by Benveniste (1958), who regards the speaker-addressee interaction as the fundamental condition for linguistic communication. In this view, intersubjectivity refers to the fact that in communication each participant is a speaking subject who is aware of the other participant as speaking subject (Benveniste 1958:258-260).

Traugott (2003) further develops Benveniste’s (1958) concept of intersubjectivity along the line of conversational interaction between speaker and hearer. Intersubjectivity, she argues, is the “explicit expression of the speaker’s attention to the ‘self’ of the addressee in both an epistemic sense (paying attention to their presumed attitudes to the content of what is said), and in a more social sense (pay-
Bert Cornillie

ing attention to their ‘face’ or ‘image needs’ associated with social stance and identity), whether or not there is mutual understanding” (Traugott 2003:128). Verhagen (2005) also refines Benveniste’s line of research on intersubjectivity by paying special attention to the construal relationship between subject(s) of conceptualization and object of conceptualization. In Verhagen’s (2005:6) view, the role of the different speech participants as cognizers is encompassing and pervasive: “the addressee is always engaging in cognitive coordination with some subject of conceptualization” and “a speaker [...] is committed to the assumption that her utterance is in principle interpretable by someone else sharing the knowledge of certain conventions”.

This paper relies on a less ambitious and more applied definition of intersubjectivity in terms of shared status of the statement emitted. As for the (inter)subjectivity of epistemic expressions, Nuyts (2001b:34) argues that:

The alternatives within this dimension [of evidentiality] could [...] be phrased as follows: does the speaker suggest that (s)he alone knows the evidence and draws a conclusion from it?; or does (s)he indicate that the evidence is known to (or accessible by) a larger group of people who share the conclusion based on it? In the former case the speaker assumes strictly personal responsibility for the epistemic qualification, in the latter case (s)he assumes a shared responsibility for it (although (s)he remains coresponsible too, of course).

Nuyts’ (2001a) proposal consists in separating the analysis of the speaker’s assessment of reality from the question as to whether the speaker shares the evidence, or assumes “the hearer’s knowledge” of the evidence used for the epistemic statement (cf. Nuyts 2001b:37). Shared evidence – or the assumption of shared evidence – leads to an intersubjective view of the state of affairs expressed by the speaker. This dimension is not only relevant for epistemic modality, but is also crucial for the analysis of evidential statements.

3.3. Testing evidentiality

In Section 4, the corpus examples will be followed by a series of concrete contextualizations so as to test the different evidential types involved. First, I will combine the parecer sentences with the comment pero yo no lo veo así ‘but I don’t see it that way’. The infelicitous combination illustrates that it is impossible to dissociate the speaker and the source of information. In this case, the parecer expression has a speaker-oriented inferential basis. Second, from Nuyts (2001b:71-
72), I borrow the (translated) questions ¿Quién lo dice? ‘Who says that?’ and ¿Tú crees? ‘Do you think so?’, which differentiate between a hearsay statement and inferential evidentiality or belief. If the two contextualizations obtain, this is an indication of an intersubjective dimension.

4. Evidential types with parecer

In this section, I analyze the different parecer constructions. It will be shown that, in contrast with the other constructions, the more grammaticalized parecer + infinitive is restricted to one evidential type only.

4.1. Parecer + infinitive

In (5), the speaker communicates that (s)he has the impression that people are reluctant to stand up to the power of television. The evidential reading of parecer + infinitive is based on inference from reasoning.

(5) ... y la música pervierte en la misma forma como un vocabulario vul- gar. Exactamente, es lo mismo.
A: Sí. Es que em... la gente parece tener miedo al enfrentar esos poderes de la televisión... (Habla Culta; Caracas: M12)
‘...and the music is perverting in the same way as popular language. Exactly, it is the same. A: Yes, in fact... one seems reluctant to stand up to the powers of broadcasting.’

The tests in (5b) detail the kind of inference at stake; they also confirm that this construction does not yield a hearsay reading.³ For the sake of convenience, I repeat the central clause of the example before turning to its contextualization.

(5) a.... la gente parece tener miedo al enfrentar esos poderes...

b. A: * pero yo no lo veo así. ‘but I don’t see it that way’
B: *¿Quién lo dice? ‘Who says that?’
B: ¿Tú crees? ‘Do you think so?’

The example in (5a) cannot be followed by the adversative clause pero yo no lo veo así ‘but I don’t see it that way’ (5b), by which the speaker would contradict the preceding proposition on the basis of
his/her own understanding of reality. A hearsay question by the interlocutor, e.g. ¿quién lo dice? ‘who says that?’ (5b) does not felicitously correspond to the statement in (5a), either. This contrasts with the fact that the statement can easily be followed by the speaker-oriented question ¿tú crees? ‘do you think so?’. The infelicitous contextualizations of (5b) illustrate that parecer + infinitive is not directly based on hearsay: no secondhand evidence is involved without the speaker’s own processing. In conclusion, parecer + infinitive does not refer to hearsay, but has an inferential reading.

In (5), inferential parecer occupies an auxiliary slot. Interestingly, this semi-auxiliary use co-exists with evidential auxiliaries such as resultar ‘turn out to’, deber ‘must’ and tener que ‘have to’. All these Spanish auxiliaries have in common that, in their evidential use, they are restricted to an inferential reading. That is, they do not allow for readings that refer to other modes of knowing than inferentiality.

4.2. Parece que

In contrast with parecer + infinitive, the parece que construction can refer to two modes of knowing. Parece que (6a) can rely on hearsay or on inference from evidence, as illustrated by the contextualization in (6b).

(6) a. A: Y ahora, después, conociendo los entretelones del asunto,... hubo que tener una explicación del problema porque parece que el secretario general le quiso hacer favores a una dama y la eligió de secretaria y trabajaba poco en secretaría; en cambio se dedicaba a otras cosas. (Habla Culta; Santiago: M49) ‘And now, afterwards, knowing the details of the case,... he had to have an explanation of the problem, because it seems that the secretary-general wanted to do favors to a lady and elected her as a secretary and she worked little in the secretariat; instead she devoted herself to other things.’

b. A: pero yo no lo veo así. ‘but I don’t see it that way’
B: ¿Quién lo dice? ‘Who says that?’
B: ¿Tú crees? ‘Do you think so?’

The parece que construction in (6a) is not as strictly speaker-oriented as the infinitival one: the adversative clause pero yo no lo veo así in (6b) can readily contradict the evidential statement made by (6a). Furthermore, both the hearsay question ¿Quién lo dice? and the question ¿Tú crees? are completely unproblematic. These questions
show that the *parece que* construction can rely on hearsay as well as on inference.

The *parece que* construction is one of the first *parecer* forms that allows complementation. It is not grammaticalized, but less lexical than the *me/le parece que* construction which lexicalizes the conceptualizer. In present-day Spanish, it is the most common *parecer* form, and can therefore be considered the default evidential use of *parecer*. The fact that it can convey two readings indicates that a medium position on the continuum between lexical and grammatical evidentiality allows for a certain evidential polyfunctionality. Let us now look at purely lexical *me parece que*.

4.3. *Me/le parece que*

The *me/le parece que* construction has a dative clitic, which functions as the conceptualizer. The *me/le parece que* construction expresses the speaker’s or another participant’s belief or opinion.

(7) a. INF A. -No creo que haya tenido ningún problema especial nuestra familia... INF.B. -Claro.
INF.A. -... y *me parece que* ese número aparece como un número -digamos- muy normal.
INF.B. -¡Qué curioso! Igual que mi madre; son seis también.
(Habla Culta; Santiago: M40)
‘A: I don’t think that our family has ever had a special problem. B: True. A: and I think that this number looks like a, let’s say, very normal number. B: How strange! Just like my mother’s [family], they are also six.’

b. A: * pero yo no lo veo así. ‘but I don’t see it that way’
B: * ¿Quién lo dice? ‘Who says that?’
B: ¿Tú crees? ‘Do you think so?’

Just like *parecer* + infinitive, the *melle parece que* construction (7a) does not admit the adversative clause *pero yo no lo veo así* (7b). That is, refutation by the conceptualizer is not possible. This shows that the conceptualizer overtly attached to the verb, coincides with the source of information – whether it be the speaker in *me*, or a third entity referred to by *le*. The opinion can but need not be based on inference from reasoning, since it can also rely on inference from visual or auditory evidence. The infelicitous question *¿quién lo dice?* in (7b) shows that the statement is not congruent with hearsay. Thus, although the speaker is not necessarily the conceptualizer, the addi-
tion of a conceptualizer makes the reading of parecer more specific than with parece que in that it blocks a clear hearsay reading.

The mode of knowing with me/le parece que is close to the ‘Belief’-type because it goes beyond the inference from direct evidence or reasoning. Unlike inferences, which are necessarily drawn at the moment of enunciation, the “belief” type is usually based on the conceptualizer’s general knowledge. In (8), the speaker uses me parece que for different means. The first two parecer constructions belong to the belief type. The last two constructions are inferential, i.e. the speaker has some evidence regarding María Isabel’s changes. The four uses all emphasize the speaker’s subjective version of the state of affairs. Nuyts (2004) considers them “subjectifiers” which belong to a different functional category than evidentiality.

(8) María Isabel se fue. Y... eh... y me parece que hace como -- no sé un lustro... muchísimo tiempo y son dos años pero me parece muchísimo. Y me parece que ya María Isabel debe haber cambiado que ya me va a costar mucho trabajo... por... para más la bestia no escribió ni una sola carta así que -- me parece que va a ser otra persona y como yo la quie-ro mucho me da mucha pena. (Habla Culta; Buenos Aires: M21 B)
‘María Isabel went away... eh... and I think it was, I don’t know 5 years ago... a lot of time and two years went by, but it seems very long ago. I think that María Isabel must have changed, which will cost a special effort...moreover, the brute didn’t write me not a single letter, thus --I think that it will be another person and since I love her so much it grieves me a lot.’

In sum, the lexical me/le parece que construction involves belief or relies on inference, but can also be a mere subjectifier without evidential qualification whatsoever. It is telling that this purely lexical construction explores the borders of evidentiality, whereas the other constructions are not inclined to do so.

4.4. Parece ser que

The parece ser que construction is a special case. According to Maldonado (p.c.) the link between ser and the que-clause is related to the nominal phrase un hecho ‘a fact’, as in (9). By means of this construction, the speaker takes some distance with respect to the evidence, without openly questioning the validity of the assertion.

(9) Es un hecho que > parece ser un hecho que > parece ser que
It is a fact that > it seems to be a fact that > It seems to be that
The statement with *parece ser que* (10) can be inferential or convey hearsay evidence.

(10) a. ¿Cómo pagan hoy los servicios secretos de todo el mundo a sus agentes? ¿Quiénes pagan mejor?
   - Señor Marina: Bueno, *parece ser que* la CIA es la que paga mejor. Yo diría que la KGB paga bastante menos.... (España Oral: CDEB033A)
   ‘a. How do the world’s secret services pay their agents? Who is paying the best? – Mister Marina: Well, it seems to be that the CIA pays the best. I would say that the KGB pays far less.’

   b. A: pero yo no lo veo así. ‘but I don’t see it that way’
   B: ¿Quién lo dice? ‘Who says that?’
   B: ¿Tú crees? ‘Do you think so?’

The inferential reading of *parece ser que* differs from that of *parece que* in that the inference is not provoked by visual or auditory evidence. The qualification then yields a certain inferred version of reality, which the speaker him/herself does not necessarily subscribe to, as shown in (11).

(11) a. El fondo es este, la cultura, los derechos de los pueblos indígenas, de los pueblos indígenas de todo el país, no solo de los de Chiapas. *parece ser que* los indígenas solo sirven como escenario, como asunto de escenografía, pues, del poder, y así no debe ser. (Entrevista (PAN), Martínez Cazares, 19-10-1998)
   ‘The essence is this, the culture, the rights of the indigenous peoples, of the peoples of the whole country, not only those in Chiapas. It seems to be that the indigenous only serve as a platform, as an affair of decor, hence, of power; it should be different.’

   b. A: pero yo no lo veo así. ‘but I don’t see it that way’
   B: ¿Quién lo dice? ‘Who says that?’
   B: ¿Tú crees? ‘Do you think so?’

In line with other inferentials, a *parece ser que* construction can combine with the speaker-oriented *¿tú crees?* question in (10b) and (11b). By means of the *¿tú crees?* question the interlocutor shows the desire to know whether the speaker agrees with this version of perceived reality, rather than questioning the speaker’s own statement. The speaker can also contrast the evidential statement in (10a) and (11a) with the adversative *pero yo no lo veo así*, e.g. (10b) and (11b).
In these examples the speaker is clearly not a firsthand witness of the payments by the CIA or the political neglect of the indigenous peoples. By means of the *parece ser que* construction (s)he distances him/herself from his/her source of information. Finally, the interlocutor can ask the ¿quién lo dice? question, which shows that (s)he can assume that the speaker’s statement relies on hearsay information or that the inference is not his/her own opinion about the state-of-affairs.

The readings of *parece que* and *parece ser que* display a different combination of hearsay and inference. With *parece que*, both hearsay information and various types of inferred knowledge can be used, whereas inferences are restricted with *parece ser que*. In order to avoid inference from visual or auditory evidence, the speaker can insert *ser* ‘to be’ in between *parecer* and *que*. This distinction is corroborated in (12), where the visual and auditory evidence is mentioned explicitly by means of *solo les dejan tocar la guitarra* ‘they only let them play the guitar’.

(12) a. *Parece (ser) que* los indígenas solo sirven como escenario.
   ‘It seems to be that the indigenous only serve as a platform.’
   b. *Parece que* los indígenas solo sirven como escenario, es que solo les dejan tocar la guitarra.
   ‘It seems that the indigenous only serve as a platform, they only let them play the guitar.’
   c. ‘*Parece ser que* los indígenas solo sirven como escenario, es que solo les dejan tocar la guitarra.
   ‘It seems to be that the indigenous only serve as a platform, they only let them play the guitar.’

The evidential statement by means of *parece que* can easily be followed by *solo les dejan tocar la guitarra* ‘they only let them play the guitar’ (12a). By contrast, this explicit reference to visual or auditory evidence does not readily combine with the *parece ser que* construction (12b). The inference from direct evidence as witnessed by *solo les dejan tocar la guitarra* ‘they only let them play the guitar’ enhances the speaker-orientedness of the expression, which turns out to be too concrete for the statement with *parece ser que*, except in ironic contexts.

An additional test confirms that *parece ser que* involves a more diffuse view of the state-of-affairs. The contrast between the felicitous addition of the conceptualizer in (13a) and its infelicitous counterpart in (13b) shows that a distant or preferably implicit source of information is invoked for the *parece ser que* construction.
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(13) a. {Según él, / le} parece que los indígenas solo sirven como escenario.
    ‘(According) to him, it seems that the indigenous only serve as a platform.’

b. {’’Según él, / ’ ’le} parece ser que los indígenas solo sirven como escenario.
    ‘(According) to him, it seems to be that the indigenous only serve as a platform.’

The addition of an overt third person conceptualizer (él or le), fully compatible with parece que, is infelicitous with parece ser que (hence the star in (13b)). This shows that the latter construction tends to be in contrast with a concrete, overt source of information. The speaker avoids reference to known conceptualizers and relegates the legitimacy of the proposition to general knowledge.

4.5. Parenthetical parecer

The parenthetical use of parecer, as exemplified in (14), has more to do with a specific position in the utterance than with a specific evidential type.⁸ My corpus research indicates that the most frequently encountered parenthetical in written discourse is al parecer ‘seemingly’, e.g. (14a), which alternates with según parece ‘by all appearances’ (14b). Furthermore, me parece ‘it seems to me’ (14c) and por lo que parece ‘by all appearances’ (14d) are most often found in spoken discourse.

(14) a. Cuando quiso reaccionar ya el pasillo estaba copado por hombres encapuchados y armados con revólveres y cuchillos, estos últimos fabricados, al parecer, en las propias celdas de los reclusos. Uno de ellos esgrimía con furia un bate de béisbol... (Notic; Col; Semana:833)
    ‘When he wanted to react, in the corridor he was already surrounded by masked men armed with guns and knives, the last ones [were] fabricated, it seems, in the very cells of the prisoners. One of them furiously threw a baseball bat.’

b. sí, hacen precisiones que rubrica[n] la sola firma del presidente general de la compañía. En esta misma forma es nombrado un director, a disgusto, según parece, de los Cano, ya para la fecha, accionistas más que minoritarios. (Notic; Col; Semana:830)
    ‘yes, they make some precisions that carry the sole hallmark of the secretary general of the company. In the same way, he is appointed director, despite the reluctance, it seems, of the
Canos, [who are] now shareholders in more than a minority position.

c. ... escribía y la señora le dictaba al dactilógrafo. Trabajamos como seis... siete días. Eran tres días para contestar eso pero había un día San Pedro creo por ahí en julio... julio me parece... eh... yo pedí prórroga. (Habla Culta; Santiago: M24)

‘... he wrote and the lady dictated him. They worked six... seven days. We had three days to reply to it, but it was also Saint Peter’s Day, I think there in July... July it seems to me... eh. I requested respite.’

d. INF -Mm, ah, bueno, habrá pendientes, habrá laderas que sean boscosas, pero-- en general Auvernia es un país muy pobre.
ENC. -¡Ah, sí? Por lo que parece, no. (Habla Culta; Buenos Aires: M13 A)

‘INF Mm, ah, good, there will be mountain slopes, there will be hillsides that are forested, but -- in general, Auvernia is a very poor country. ENC: - oh, yes? By the look of it, not [really].’

As can be seen from the foregoing translations, the different parenthetical constructions do not rely on the same source of information. Indeed, the *al parecer* construction in (14a) is based on either reported information or inferences. Other parentheticals do not necessarily involve secondhand information even if the reportive interpretation does not seem to be excluded. For example, the inferential statement with *según parece* in (14b) can be based on visual or auditory evidence. The speaker interprets the situation surrounding the appointment of the new director and infers that the change of boss did not fit the strategy of the Canos. The other two parentheticals license inferences that do not involve other parties. The *me parece* parenthetical in (14c) is an expression with a subjectifier function similar to the belief mode of knowing. This is corroborated by the fact that *creo que* ‘I think’ precedes the *me parece* parenthetical. The parenthetical *por lo que parece* in (14d), for its part, has an inferential value which comes from direct evidence only. Here the speaker is involved in the visual or sensory perception and comes to a conclusion on the basis of what (s)he perceives. In contrast to (14c) where the stimulus, *creo que*, is overtly mentioned, in (14d) the source of the inferential statement does not show up explicitly.

In sum, parenthetical statements can be triggered by several types of concrete stimuli: reported information, inference from reasoning or visual/auditory evidence, and belief. As argued in Section 2, parentheticals cannot be considered a complementation type that
occupies a specific position on the grammaticalization scale. Instead, they are seen as lexical expressions the reading of which is determined by lexical semantics. Further research will have to look at the polyfunctionality of evidential parentheticals.

4.6. Summary

The parecer constructions correlate with various combinations of evidential values. The main finding is that the grammaticalized parecer + infinitive construction only has inferential readings, while the parece (ser) que construction yields either hearsay or inferential readings. The non-grammaticalized, lexical construction of me/le parece que has a reading that cannot be detached from the lexicalized conceptualizer. The parentheticals convey various readings and, in the same line, do not constitute a construction type that can be situated on a grammaticalization scale.

5. (Inter)subjectivity

Let us now link the above-presented analysis of parecer with previous accounts in the Spanish linguistic literature. Note that parece que is given a “near-factive” reading, whereas a “non-factive” value is attributed to parecer + adjective and parecer + infinitive (cf. Fernández-Leborans 1999:2453; Porroche-Ballesteros 1990:129-135). Previous analyses do not explain these different degrees of factivity, nor are the other constructions accounted for.

The near-factive reading of parece que cannot easily be accounted for on the basis of its modes of knowing. Since parece que can have either an inferential or a hearsay evidential value, an additional dimension should explain the intuitions about factivity. In this section, I will briefly propose that the intersubjectivity can help us interpret the difference between parece que and parecer + infinitive.

A statement is subjective when the evidence is restricted to the speaker’s realm, while a statement is called intersubjective when the speaker (assumes s/he) shares it with other people. In contrast with Bermúdez (2002), who argues that parecer + infinitive is intersubjective, I show that parece que can be considered intersubjective in the majority of cases.

I argue that the more grammaticalized parecer + infinitive stands for a subjective evidential statement, while parecer + que-clause with-
out conceptualizer can express an intersubjective statement. In (15) a person has traveled abroad, which seems to have had a good influence on him/her.

(15) Decidí respirar un poco y viajar fuera del país por unas semanas. Parece que el viaje me hizo mucho bien; según ellos, tenía mejor semblante. (Notic; Perú; Caretas:1451)
‘I decided to breathe a bit and travel abroad for a couple of weeks. It seems that the journey did me good; according to them, I looked better.’

In the parece que construction in (15), the evidential statement is shared with other people, which is corroborated by según ellos ‘according to them’ in the context. This explicit mention of shared evidence leads me to conclude that the statement is intersubjective. In direct speaker-hearer interaction, however, parece que can also express a subjective statement, e.g. (16). Yet, although the statement is probably not shared, all speech participants have access to the evidence, which results in the assertion associated with both the subjective and the intersubjective readings of parece que.⁹

(16) Parece que no me entiendes. (Habla Culta; Colombia:M1)
‘It seems that you don’t understand me’

The infinitival constructions in (17), by contrast, always imply a subjective statement.

(17) a. La segunda ley es la que tendrá que decidir cómo reestructurar los pasivos de las empresas con el Estado. Es decir, la carne y cómo cortarla. Todo parece indicar que el gobierno se inclina por aceptar únicamente las deudas tributarias. (Notic; Perú; Caretas:1427)
‘The second law is the one that will have to decide how to restructure the assets and liabilities of the companies with the State. That is, the meat and how to cut it. Everything seems to indicate that the government is inclined to accept only the debt subject to tax.’

b. En estas corrientes se basa la polémica de hoy, en un contexto donde la pedagogía parece atravesar por una crisis. (Encicl: Pedagogía)
‘In these streams today’s controversy is based, and in a context in which pedagogy seems to be going through a crisis’
With *parecer* + infinitive, the statement is not intersubjective but subjective. In (17a), the author makes his/her point by using the expression *todo parece indicar que* ‘everything seems to indicate that’. The interlocutors or other people are not responsible for the inference made by the speaker/writer. This is also the case in (17b), where access to the source of information may be shared with other people, although the statement that the pedagogical sciences are facing a crisis is a personal consideration of the speaker, reflecting his/her understanding of pedagogical sciences.

I conclude that the (inter)subjective status of evidence and statement is a good descriptive alternative for the notion of “near-factivity” used in previous accounts of *parecer*. When a statement is supported by more people it can be viewed as having a higher factive value. By contrast, when the speaker is solely responsible for the evidential qualification with *parecer* its factivity is not automatically warranted.

6. Conclusions

In this paper, I have shown that the specific function of evidential *parecer* is linked to the grammatical or lexical status of the verb. It has also become clear that there may be a correlation between the continuum from lexical to grammatical, on the one hand, and the modes of knowing expressed, on the other. I have suggested that the higher the degree of grammaticalization of a *parecer* construction is, the less evidential values it can express. By means of a series of functional-pragmatic tests I have shown that the *parece que* construction involves a broader array of evidential types than both *me/le parece que* and *parecer* + infinitive. These two constructions can be considered the lexical and the grammatical endpoints of the continuum, respectively. The tests confirm the claim that *me/le parece que* is attached to the conceptualizer, whereas the grammaticalized *parecer* + infinitive construction conveys an inferential qualification that is restricted to the speaker.

The concept of (inter)subjectivity has proven to be a useful addition. Since intersubjective statements have broader support than subjective ones, the former are seen as more reliable and are, hence, considered to express “near-factivity”, while, based on the speaker’s inference only, the latter lead to a “non-factive” interpretation. With *parece que*, the access to the evidence is always intersubjective. By contrast, *parecer* + infinitive conveys only subjective statements.
In sum, the different distribution of the evidential readings with \textit{parecer} gives a more delicate analysis of the different evidential values of lexical and grammatical expressions.

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\textsuperscript{1} Verhagen (2005) distinguishes between personal and impersonal (inter)subjectivity and attributes a specific role to the conceptualizer. His model combines Cognitive Grammar subjectivist claims on conceptualization with attention to the speaker-hearer interaction.

\textsuperscript{2} Albeit without reference to (inter)subjectivity, Faller (2002:8), in her dissertation on Quechua evidentials, also attempts to further subdivide between evidence used by the speaker and shared information in terms of two independent scales. On the one hand, the author wants to differentiate between direct and inferential knowledge on the basis of a scale, here (i), “that is ordered according to the amount of inference involved in arriving at a statement”. On the other hand, Faller proposes a second scale that is ordered according to the number of intervening speakers (ii).

(i). visual > auditory > other sensory > inference from results > reasoning
(ii). (direct) > secondhand > thirdhand > hearsay/lore
Since Spanish is not rich in morphosyntactic evidentials, the ordering in scale (ii) will not be followed. Instead the concept of (inter)subjectivity will be used.

\textsuperscript{3} My findings coincide with those of Bermúdez (2002:26), who calls it deduction instead of inference: “puede deducirse de la evidencia directa” ‘can be deduced from direct evidence’.

\textsuperscript{4} For the sake of the example, I only mention me ‘me’ and le ‘him/her’, although the whole dative paradigm (singular and plural) could be used.

\textsuperscript{5} The dative with \textit{parecer} could also be called experiencer. However, since the latter term is most often used in the context of psychological reaction, e.g. \textit{le molesta} ‘it bothers him/her’, I prefer the term “conceptualizer” (cf. Langacker 1987). The conceptualizer refers to the entity that views the scene, which can be the speaker, the hearer or another entity objectively or subjectively present in the construction.

\textsuperscript{6} Anderson (1986:284) labels \textit{it seems to me} as “experiential inference”. That is, it is a kind of direct inference based on the conceptualizer’s own experience.

\textsuperscript{7} Combé (1981:190) describes constructions like \textit{parece ser} ‘it seems to be’ as bearing “an emphatic, matter-of-fact or explanatory force”. These qualifications can be related to the possible sources of information. The explanatory force is inferential in nature; the matter-of-fact reading has to do with the possible hearsay evidence.
The continuum between lexical and grammatical evidentiality

Unlike the left-dislocation or the infinitival construction, the parenthetical use of *parecer* cannot be considered a construction type with a specific syntax. In some way, the parenthetical is a clause in a clause with a "relative syntactic autonomy with respect to the propositional content" (Bosque 1990:32-33) [my translation].

In his study of (Wanka) Quechua reportatives, Floyd (1996:931-932) words the relation between hearsay and 'validation' (commitment) this way: “The validational notions associated with the reportative are ambiguous and might be better thought of as a byproduct of the degree of confidence in the individual who served as the information source: if the speaker believes the origin's account is trustworthy, he will also believe the story. In other words, they are implicatures from the speaker's construal of the origin’s relationship to the designated conceptualization. This goes counter to the view in which reportative evidentials are viewed primarily as devices to relinquish personal responsibility for the contents of an utterance”.

Bibliographical references


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