Abstract

Title: On abductive uses of Japanese “hazu”

In this talk, we will present an analysis of Japanese auxiliary *hazu* in reference to the one by Copley (2006) on *should*, and claim that we need an additional tier of modal semantics based on the concept of commitment to capture its behavior with respect to Moore’s Paradox. First, we show that there are abductive uses of *hazu*, which involve the epistemic modal base. Then, we point out that in this epistemic reading as well as in the circumstantial one, *hazu* doesn’t suffer from Moore’s Paradox, which shows that this fact doesn’t lie in the existence of the circumstantial modal base. We thus present a new analysis to grasp this observation.

Japanese auxiliary *hazu* has a meaning which roughly corresponds to *should* in English in its epistemic use. They both express the speaker’s judgment based on her inference:

(1) a. The plane should land in a few minutes. [Rivière (1981)]
      plane-Topic in few minutes land-in HAZU-copula

More importantly, *hazu* appears to have the constraint in common with *should* that they cannot express abductive (i.e. from-effect-to-cause) inference:

(2) [The speaker sees the wet ground]
   a. #It should have rained. [Copley (2006)]
   b. #Ame-ga hut-ta hazu-da.
      rain-Nom fall-past HAZU-copula

However, as for *hazu*, this constraint can be relaxed in certain environments. For example, when the evidence from which the conclusion is drawn is presented in conditional clauses, abductive uses of *hazu* are allowed (Mori & Park 2013):

(3) Zimen-ga nure-teiru nara, ame-ga hut-ta hazu-da.
   ground-Nom wet-Cont. Conditional rain-Nom fall-past HAZU-copula
   “If the ground is wet, it should[HAZU] have rained.”

In this case, the content of the conditional clause is felt to be reported by someone. From (2) and (3), one can realize that the abductive *hazu* imposes a restriction on the evidence: The evidence is more or less qualified as indirect. Moreover, the necessary existence of conditionals and likes suggests that
the epistemic modal base is involved in abductive uses of hazu.

Now we discuss the relationship between modal bases used for hazu and should and Moore’s Paradox. First, both hazu and should don’t suffer from Moore’s Paradox in their non-abductive use:

(5)

a. The beer should be cold by now, but it isn’t. [Copley (2006)]


   beer-Topic long since cold-Cont. HAZU-Conj cold-Cont.-Neg

This fact can be explained away if we assume the circumstantial modal base (Kratzer 1981), which takes only relevant facts into consideration (Abusch 2012), not everything that is actually the case. However, hazu doesn’t cause the paradox even in its abductive use, which involves the epistemic modal base:

(6) Zimen-ga nure-teiru nara, ame-ga hut-ta hazu-nanoni (zissai-wa) hut-tei-nai

   ground-Nom wet-Cont. Conditionalrain-Nom fall-past HAZU-Conj in fact fall-Cont.-Neg

   “If the ground is wet, it should[HAZU] have rained, but (in fact) it didn’t.”

We explain this fact based on the notion of commitment (Mori & Okano 2013), the degree of the speaker’s certainty on the truth of the prejacent, besides the ordinary Kratzerian semantics, in contrast to Copley’s (2006) presuppositional approach.
References


<http://copley.free.fr/copley.should.pdf>


